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California Supreme Court Survey
December 1994 - July 1995
The California Supreme Court Survey provides a brief synopsis of recent
decisions by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the read-
er of issues that the supreme court has addressed, as well as to serve as a start-
ing point for researching any of the topical areas. Attorney discipline, judicial
misconduct, and death penalty appeal cases have been omitted from the survey.
The survey will review California Supreme Court cases in either and article
or summary format. Articles provide an in-depth analysis of selected California
Supreme Court cases including the potential impact a case may have on Califor-
nia law. Additionally, articles guide the reader to secondary sources that focus
on specific points of law.
Summaries provide a brief outline of the areas of law addressed in selected
California Supreme Court cases. Summaries are designed to provide the reader
with a basic understanding of the legal implications of a cases in a concise
format.
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I. ADOPTION
An unwed father who does not meet the re-
quirements of a "presumed father" under California
Family Code section 7611 has no statutory right,
and will be denied a constitutional right, to with-
hold his consent to a third-party adoption if he does
not promptly commit to his parental obligations
during the pregnancy:
Adoption of Michael H ...................... 1011
II. BAIL CONDITIONS
Even though imposing random drug testing and
warrantless searches following own recognizance
releases from custody may implicate constitutional
rights, these conditions are reasonable and, as such,
do not have to relate to assuring an appearance at a
subsequent court proceeding:
In re York ................................ 1018
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Ill. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
An injunction requiring protesters to demonstrate
across the street from an abortion clinic withstands
constitutional scrutiny under the new test estab-
lished by the United States Supreme Court in
Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 114 S.Ct. 2516
(1994), where that injunction is content neutral,
serves significant state interests, leaves adequate
alternative avenues of communication, and burdens
protesters' First Amendment rights no more than is
necessary to serve state interests:
Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo
v. Williams .............................. 1026
IV. CRIMINAL LAw
A. Enhancement of a defendant's sentence for posses-
sion of a weapon during the commission of a drug
offense is valid even if the defendant was not
present at the time the drugs and weapon were
seized, as long as the defendant knew of the weapon,
the weapon was near the drugs, and the defendant
could have used the weapon in furtherance of the
drug offense:
People v. Bland .......................... 1033
B. A court may bifurcate the jury trial of an alleged
repeat offender into two proceedings: one, to deter-
mine whether the defendant is guilty of the current-
ly charged crime, and; two, to determine whether
the defendant was previously convicted:
People v. Calderon ....................... 1038
C. A person may be convicted of possession of an ille-
gal drug despite having ingested the drug prior to
arrest if there is substantial evidence of past posses-
sion:
People v. Palaschak ....................... 1047
D. Under California Penal Code section 208(d), kid-
napping with intent to commit rape is a separate
offense, not an enhancement to simple kidnapping,
and movement of a victim at night from a parking
lot to an area 105 feet away behind a wall was suf-
ficient evidence of asportation to support a kidnap-
ping conviction:
People v. Rayford ........................ 1052
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E. A trial court's failure to give jury instructions on
elements of sentence enhancement for use of a dead-
ly or dangerous weapon under California Penal
Code section 12022(b) warrants a reversal only
where it is reasonably probable that without the
error, the jury would have decided more favorably
for the defendant:
People v. W ies ............................ 1057
V. LANDLORD AND TENANT
When the government requires that real property be
brought into statutory compliance, and its condition
is not the direct result of the lessee's specific use, the
court must undertake a two-part analysis to deter-
mine whether the lessor or the lessee is liable for the
cost of compliance: (1) the court must evaluate the
extent to which the terms of the lease suggest that
the lessee is liable, and (2) the court must then look
at circumstantial factors surrounding the lease.
Unless both parts of this analysis point to liability
on the lessee, the lessor will bear the cost of compli-
ance:
Hadian v. Schwartz ....................... 1067
VI. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
An action for malicious prosecution lies when at
least one of several possible grounds of recovery
lacks probable cause and is brought with malice:
Crowley v. Katleman ....................... 1073
VII. REFERENDUM
Article XI, section (1)(b) of the California Constitu-
tion neither restricts nor secures the local right of
referendum on employee compensation decisions,
while Government Code section 25123(e)'s exemp-
tion from referendum is constitutionally justified
because it advances legislative goals of statewide
concern:
Voters for Responsible Retirement v. Board of
Supervisors .......................... ... 1080
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SUMMARIES
1. Civil Procedure
A court's finding that a defendant cannot rea-
sonably be served except by publication of the
summons is not sufficient to show that the de-
fendant was not amenable to the process of the
court.
Watts v. Crawford, Supreme Court of California,
decided July 6, 1995, 10 Cal. 4th 743, 896 P.2d 807,
42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81 ........................ 1087
II. Compromise and Settlement
The term "party" in Code of Civil Procedure
section 664.6 refers solely to litigants; thus,
parties cannot be bound by settlement agree-
ments signed only by their attorneys.
Levy v. Superior Court, Supreme Court of Califor-
nia, decided June 22, 1995, 10 Cal. 4th 578, 896
P.2d 171, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 878 (1995) ........... 1088
Il. Counties
A county has authority under the California
Constitution to amend its charter and create a
citizens law enforcement review board under the
direction of the county board of supervisors.
Furthermore, granting the review board the
power to issue subpoenas is within the scope of
power conferrable on county officers.
Dibb v. County of San Diego, Supreme Court of
California, decided Dec. 12, 1994, 8 Cal. 4th 1200,
884 P.2d 1003, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55 ............. 1089
IV. Criminal Law
A. Under California Welfare and Institutions Code,
section 3201(c), a convicted felon involuntarily
committed for narcotic addiction is not entitled
to good behavior and participation credits to
lessen the felon's determinate prison sentence,
if the crime was committed on or after January
1, 1983.
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I. ADOPTION
An unwed father who does not meet the re-
quirements of a '!presumed father" under California
Family Code section 7611 has no statutory right,
and will be denied a constitutional right, to with-
hold his consent to a third-party adoption if he does
not promptly commit to his parental obligations
during the pregnancy: Adoption of Michael H.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Adoption of Michael H.,' the California Supreme Court decided
whether an unwed father who did not meet the statutory requirements of
a "presumed father" under the Family Code may nevertheless have a
constitutional right to object to a third-party adoption of his child.2 The
1. 10 Cal. 4th 1043, 898 P.2d 891, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445 (1995). Justice Mosk wrote
the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Arabian, Baxter,
George, and Werdegar concurred. Id. at 1043-60, 898 P.2d at 891-901, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 445-55. Justice Kennard wrote a separate opinion, concurring and dissenting. Id. at
1060-73, 898 P.2d at 901-10, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455-64 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
2. Id. at 1047-48, 898 P.2d at 892-93, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446-47; see CAL. FAm.
CODE § 7611 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
In July 1990, Stephanie learned she was pregnant. Michael H., 10 Cal. 4th at
1048, 898 P.2d at 893, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447. She and her boyfriend Mark decided
that adoption was their best alternative. Id. Mark attended some birthing classes with
Stephanie and bought a trailer for them to live in. Id. However, they never moved
into it together. Id. As the pregnancy progressed, their relationship grew increasingly
unstable. Id. Mark checked himself into a drug rehabilitation hospital after he had
"two violent outbursts" toward Stephanie, which culminated in his arrest for assault
and his subsequent attempted suicide. Id. In November 1990, while in the hospital,
Mark decided not to give his child up for adoption. Id. In January 1991, Stephanie
moved into the San Diego home of the prospective adoptive parents, John and Mar-
garet. Id. at 1049, 898 P.2d at 893, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447. After Michael was born
on February 27, 1991, John and Margaret took immediate custody of him. Id. It was
not until after Michael's birth that Mark asked for custody. Id. The adoptive parents
petitioned the court to terminate Mark's status as father, and Mark brought an action
to establish a father-child relationship. Id.; see CAL. FAM. CODE § 7662 (West 1994)
(petition to terminate parental rights of father); id. § 7630 (action to determine father
and child relationship).
The trial court determined that Mark was not a "presumed father" under § 7611
and that it was in the best interest of the child to be adopted by John and Margaret.
Michael H., 10 Cal. 4th at 1049, 898 P.2d at 893-94, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447-48. While
Mark's appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court decided Adoption of Kelsey
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court found that in order for the natural father to have a constitutional
right to withhold his consent to the adoption, he would first have to
meet the requirements of Kelsey S.3 Reversing the court of appeal, the
supreme court held that since the father in the present case did not im-
mediately and continually commit to his parental responsibilities after
learning of the pregnancy, he had no constitutional basis to interfere
with the adoption.'
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Mosk, writing for the majority, began his discussion with a
review of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), focusing on the require-
ments for an unwed father to be considered a "presumed father."5 The
court noted that the UPA creates three different types, or "classes" of
parents: mothers, fathers who meet the statutory requirements as "pre-
sumed fathers," and biological fathers who are not presumed fathers.'
Since the trial court had found that Mark, the biological father in this
s., which held that in some cases an unwed father may have a constitutional right to
object to the third-party adoption of his child. 10 Cal. 4th at 1049, 898 P.2d at 894,
43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 448; see Adoption of Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th 816, 823 P.2d 1216, 4
Cal. Rptr. 2d 615 (1992). The court of appeal remanded the case to the trial court
for a determination of whether Mark had a constitutional right to object to the adop-
tion under the Kelsey S. standard. Michael H., 10 Cal. 4th at 1049, 898 P.2d at 894,
43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 448. On remand, the trial court found that Mark did have a con-
stitutional basis to block the adoption, and the court of appeal affirmed. Id. at 1050,
898 P.2d at 894, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 448.
3. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th 816, 823 P.2d 1216, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615. The court stated:
"If an unwed father promptly comes forward and demonstrates a full commitment to
his parental responsibilities-emotional, financial, and otherwise-his federal consti-
tutional right to due process prohibits the termination of his parental relationship
absent a showing of his unfitness as a parent." Id. at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 635. For a thorough discussion of the Kelsey S. decision, see Norman
Allen, Adoption of Kelsey S.: When Does an Unwed Father Know Best?, 24 PAc. L.J.
1633 (1993).
4. Michael H., 10 Cal. 4th at 1060, 898 P.2d at 901, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455.
5. Id. at 1050, 898 P.2d at 894, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 448. The UPA begins with
section 7600 of the Family Code. CAL. FhM. CODE §§ 7600-7730 (West 1994 & Supp.
1995). Section 7611, subdivision (d), provides that an unmarried father can qualify as
a presumed father if: "[hie receives the child into his home and openly holds out the
child as his natural child." CAL. FAm. CODE § 7611(d) (West 1994 & Supp. 1995). See
generally 10 B.E. WITIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Parent and Child §§ 409-410
(9th ed. 1989 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the nature and purpose of UPA, and defining
parent-child relationship).
6. Michael H., 10 Cal. 4th at 1051, 898 P.2d at 895, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449; see
CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7611-7612 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995); see also 32 CAL. JUR. 3D
Family Law § 126 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (defining "parent").
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case, was not a presumed father under the statute, he fell into the third
category.7 The court concluded that, under the Kelsey S. test, Mark may
still have a constitutional basis to veto the adoption.'
The court then turned to the requirements set forth in Kelsey S.: the
biological father must prove that he promptly came forward and took
sufficient steps to demonstrate a "full commitment to his parental re-
sponsibilities" in order to assert the constitutional right.9 The court as-
serted that the mere fact that a biological relationship existed between
the father and child was not sufficient to provide a constitutional right to
block the adoption. °
Turning to the facts of the case, the court took note of several fac-
tors which would weigh against Mark.' First, the child Michael had
been in the custody of the adoptive parents since birth (over four years),
and Mark had little chance to develop any meaningful relationship with
Michael. Additionally, the adoptive parents were the only parents Michael
had ever known. 2
Next, the court focused on the time from July to October 1990, as
the crucial period when Mark should have shown his full commitment to
his impending parental responsibilities."' The court reiterated that the
father must demonstrate the willingness to assume these responsibilities
within a short time after learning of the pregnancy, and that this com-
mitment must continue during the pregnancy. 4 Since Mark had waited
many months before asserting his willingness to be a parent, he could
not block the proposed third-party adoption. 5
Additionally, the court emphasized several public policy goals which
supported their decision to deny Mark a constitutional basis for blocking
7. Michael H., 10 Cal. 4th at 1051, 898 P.2d at 895, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449.
8. Id. at 1052, 898 P.2d at 896, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 450.
9. Id. (quoting Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
635).
10. Id.; see also 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 58 (1991) (discussing parental con-
sent for adoption of illegitimate children). See generally 32 CAL. JUR. 3D Family Law
§ 127 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (defining child and children);
11. Michael H., 10 Cal. 4th at 1053, 898 P.2d at 896, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 450.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1054-55, 898 P.2d at 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 451. The court emphasized
that if a father does not promptly assert this commitment, "he cannot compensate
for his failure to do so by attempting to assume his parental responsibilities many
months after learning of the pregnancy." Id. at 1054, 898 P.2d at 897, 43 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 451.
15. Id. at 1055, 898 P.2d at 898, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151-52.
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the adoption. 6 First, the biological father should promptly inform the
mother of whether or not he objects to a proposed adoption of the child
so that both parties have time to weigh their alternatives, including abor-
tion. 7 Second, an unwed mother is likely to be in great need of the
emotional and financial support offered by the father who promptly dem-
onstrates his responsibilities, and unwed fathers should be encouraged to
provide this support." Third, requiring an unwed father to make his pa-
rental intentions known early on in the pregnancy results in greater cer-
tainty regarding the permanence of the proposed adoption."' Finally, the
court rejected the attack on the statute's constitutionality, finding that
the statute did not discriminate between unwed mothers and unwed fa-
thers."
The court concluded that Mark had not promptly come forward to
demonstrate his full commitment to parenthood, and that he failed to
assert his intended objection to the proposed adoption. Therefore,
Mark had no constitutional right to object to the third-party adoption. As
a result, the court remanded the case to the superior court with instruc-
tions to rule in favor of the adoptive parents.22
B. Justice Kennard's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennard concurred in the ultimate result that Michael re-
main with his adoptive parents, but dissented as to the majority's conclu-
sion that Mark had not met the Kelsey S. requirements.23 She found that
Mark's actions would provide a constitutional basis for him to object to
the adoption; however, she believed the Kelsey S. decision should not be
applied retroactively.24
16. Id. at 1055-56, 898 P.2d at 898-99, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452-53.
17. Id. at 1055, 898 P.2d at 898, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452. The court stressed the
importance of a timely decision and notification by the father, reasoning that the
mother "has only a relatively short time to make and implement her choice." Id.
18. Id. at 1055-56, 898 P.2d at 898, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452.
19. Id. at 1056, 898 P.2d at 898, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452. See generally Brooke A.
Gershon, Throwing Out the Baby with the Bath Water: Adoption of Kelsey S. Raises
the Rights of Unwed Fathers Above the Best Interests of the Child, 28 LoY. LA. L
REv. 741 (1995) (discussing the need for certainty and finality in adoptions).
20. Michael H., 10 Cal. 4th at 1059, 898 P.2d at 900, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454. In
particular, the court pointed to "the many public policy justifications" offered by the
prospective adoptive parents that demonstrated the substantial state interest involved.
Id. at 1059-60, 898 P.2d at 901, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455.
21. Id. at 1060, 898 P.2d at 901, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1060-61, 898 P.2d at 901-02, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455-56 (Kennard, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
24. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Justice Kennard focused on all of Mark's actions, including his con-
duct after Michael was born.25 She found that, looking at all the relevant
circumstances both before and after the birth, Mark did everything possi-
ble to demonstrate his parental commitment to Michael.26
Justice Kennard then conceded that Kelsey S. should not be applied
retroactively because Michael had been with his adoptive parents for
over four years and the parties had relied on pre-Kelsey S. case law.2
Balancing the interests, she concluded that the baby's need for continuity
and a stable home outweighed any retroactive effect giving Mark parental
rights.2
IlI. IMPACT
This decision does not change pre-existing law, but it does reinforce
the requirements necessary for an unwed father to assert the right to
object to an impending adoption.' The California Family Code defines
both fathers and "presumed fathers. "' Prior to Kelsey S., if a biological
25. Id. at 1065-66, 898 P.2d at 904-05, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 458-59 (Kennard, J., con-
curring and dissenting). Justice Kennard asserted that the court below had found am-
ple evidence to show that Mark had sufficiently demonstrated his commitment to par-
enthood. Id. at 1064, 898 P.2d at 903, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 457 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
26. Id. at 1067, 898 P.2d at 906, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 460 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting). Justice Kennard attacked the majority for focusing on the narrow
time between July and November of 1990. Id. at 1068, 898 P.2d at 906, 43 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 460 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). She gave greater weight to Mark's
continued acknowledgment of paternity and his "impressive efforts" to pursue legal
custody after Michael's birth than the majority did. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
27. Id. at 1070-71, 898 P.2d at 908-09, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 462-63 (Kennard, J., con-
curring and dissenting). While Justice Kennard noted that she had originally agreed
that Kelsey S. should be applied retroactively, the present case convinced her that
the Kelsey S. decision could not be made retroactive without prejudice to the parties
involved. Michael H., 10 Cal. 4th at 1072, 898 P.2d at 909, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 463
(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
28. Michael H., 10 Cal. 4th at 1072-73, 898 P.2d at 909-10, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 463-
64 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
29. Id. at 1060, 898 P.2d at 901, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455; see Janet L. Dolgin, Just
a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L REV. 637 (1993) (ex-
ploring United States Supreme Court cases regarding paternal rights and the changing
definition of the traditional family).
30. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995) (defining natural and
presumed fathers). See generally 30 B.E. WITUN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Parent
and Child § 442 (9th Ed. 1989 & Supp. 1995) (discussing termination of rights of
1015
father did not qualify as a presumed father under the statute he could
not object to a third-party adoption of his child.' The Kelsey S. decision
gave unwed fathers who were not presumed fathers an alternative to the
statutory requirements.' If a biological father promptly came forward to
demonstrate his commitment to the child and his intention to fulfill his
parental responsibilities, he could be given the same opportunities a
"presumed father" would have under the statute.'
The present case further defines the extent to which an unwed
father must demonstrate his intent: the court explained that "promptly"
means he will have to make his intention to be a father to the child
known to the mother as soon as he learns of the pregnancy.' The court
focused the inquiry on the father's conduct during the pregnancy.a5
More importantly, Michael H. affirms the important public policy goals of
assuring permanency in adoption situations, and that the welfare of the
child should take priority when balancing the equities.36
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision in Michael H. will likely provide greater guidance for
lawyers representing both adoptive parents and unwed fathers. The court
father who is not a presumed father).
31. See Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th 816, 823 P.2d 1216, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615; CAL. FAM.
CODE § 7664 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995) (explaining claims of parental rights and
adoption). See generally, Christian R. Van Deusen, The Best Interest of the Child and
the Law, 18 PEEP. L. REV. 417 (1991) (exploring the rights of both children and par-
ents surrounding adoption).
32. Michael H., 10 Cal. 4th at 1063, 898 P.2d at 903, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 457
(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). This alternative right is based on the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.; see Kelsey
S., 1 Cal. 4th at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
33. Michael H., 10 Cal. 4th at 1060, 898 P.2d at 901, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455; see
Rebecca L. Steward, Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers: Is Equal Protection
Equal for Unwed Fathers?, 19 Sw. U. L. REV. 1087 (1990) (arguing for constitutional
protection of parental rights for fathers regardless of marital status).
34. Michael H., 10 Cal. 4th at 1060, 898 P.2d at 901, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455.
35. Id. The court did refer to Mark's concealment from Stephanie and the prospec-
tive adoptive parents of his hidden intent to veto the adoption and seek custody of
the baby prior to Michael's birth. Id. Though the majority did not expressly highlight
Mark's personal problems during the pregnancy in its discussion of the case, the fact
that Mark was recovering from a drug addiction and had been arrested for assault
probably factored into their decision. See id. at 1048, 898 P.2d at 893, 43 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 447.
36. Id. at 1055, 898 P.2d at 898, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452; see Mindy S. Halpern, Fa-
ther Knows Best-But Which Father? California's Presumption of Legitimacy Loses
Its Conclusiveness: Michael H. v. Gerald D. and Its Aftermath, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
275 (1991) (discussing policy issues underlying the presumption of fatherhood). The
Michael H. case discussed by Ms. Halpern was a United States Supreme Court case,
not the same case discussed here.
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has narrowed the definition of when an unwed father who is not a "pre-
sumed father" may yet have a constitutional right to withhold his consent
for a third-party adoption." If an unwed father wants to block the adop-
tion of his biological child, he will have to act quickly to demonstrate his
commitment to fatherhood.
DEBRA E. BEST
1017
37. Michael H., 10 Cal. 4th at 1060, 898 P.2d at 901, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455; cf.
32 CAL JUR. 3D, Family Law § 155 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (stating the requirement that
only consent of the child's mother is needed for an adoption if there is no "pre-
sumed father").
II. BAIL CONDITIONS
Even though imposing random drug testing and
warrantless searches following own recognizance
releases from custody may implicate constitutional
rights, these conditions are reasonable and, as such,
do not have to relate to assuring an appearance at a
subsequent court proceeding: In re York.
I. INTRODUCTION
In In re York,' the California Supreme Court considered whether a
judge or magistrate, in deciding to release a defendant from custody on
his own recognizance, "may condition such release upon the defendant's
agreement to submit to random drug testing and warrantless search and
seizure during that [release] period."2 The supreme court affirmed the
court of appeal by holding that conditioning release in such a way was
permitted in appropriate circumstances and did not violate statutory or
constitutional provisions.3
1. 9 Cal. 4th 1133, 892 P.2d 804, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308 (1995). Justice George
wrote the unanimous decision, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk,
Kennard, Arabian, Baxter, and Werdegar concurred. Id. at 1137-53, 892 P.2d at 805-16,
40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 309-20.
2. Id. at 1137, 892 P.2d at 805, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 309. This case was brought on
behalf of 11 individuals who had each been charged with at least one drug-related
offense. Id. at 1138, 892 P.2d at 805-06, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 309-10. Because petition-
ers could not post bail, each was allowed to either remain in custody until trial or
obtain a release on their own recognizance, conditioned upon an agreement to com-
ply with several conditions, including random drug and alcohol testing and warrant-
less searches and seizures of their person, homes, and vehicles. Id. at 1138, 892 P.2d
at 806, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 310. Several of the petitioners objected, but in each case,
the judge or magistrate refused to release them without their agreement to the condi-
tions. Id. These conditions were imposed without considering the specific drug histo-
ry of each petitioner. Id.
The court of appeal consolidated the cases and ruled that a "court or magistrate
may, in appropriate circumstances, condition a defendant's [own recognizance] release
upon a defendant's agreement to submit to random drug testing and warrantless
search and seizure" so long as the specific facts of the case warrant such imposi-
tions. Id. at 1139, 892 P.2d at 806, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 310. The judge or magistrate
in the present cases, however, failed to make individual inquiries as to the reason-
ableness of the conditions, and therefore, "[t]he Court of Appeal issued writs of habe-
as corpus, vacating those portions of the ... release orders that required submission
to random drug testing and warrantless search and seizure." Id. Because an inquiry
into the specific facts of each case would likely re-impose the same conditions, the
petitioners sought review in the California Supreme Court, contending that a judge or
magistrate cannot condition an own recognizance release upon agreement to submit
to random drug tests and warrantless searches and seizures. Id.
3. Id. at 1137-38, 892 P.2d at 805, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 309.
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II. TREATMENT
A. California Penal Code Section 1318
In In re York, petitioners first asserted that random drug testing and
warrantless search and seizure conditions violated the "reasonable con-
ditions" element placed upon a court in releasing a defendant on his own
recognizance as set forth in California Penal Code section 1318(a)(2).4
Petitioners argued that "reasonable conditions" meant only those condi-
tions reasonably related to assuring a defendant's presence at a subse-
quent proceeding, and that even if it did not, the statute could not be
interpreted to allow conditions to be imposed which would require a
waiver of the defendant's constitutional rights.'
The supreme court first turned to the text of California Penal Code
section 1318 to determine the definition of "reasonable conditions."6 The
court found that the section did not include any specific language to
clarify the definition.7 The court then examined the legislative history
and found that, when sponsoring the 1988 amendment to section 1318,
the California Attorney General set forth several conditions placed upon
defendants released on their own recognizance.' These conditions,
4. Id. at 1141, 892 P.2d at 808, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 312.
California Penal Code § 1318 provides:
(a) The defendant shall not be released from custody under an own recogni-
zance until the defendant files with the clerk of the court or other person
authorized to accept bail a signed release agreement which includes: (1) The
defendant's promise to appear at all times and places, as ordered by the
court or magistrate and as ordered by any court in which, or any magistrate
before whom the charge is subsequently pending. (2) The defendant's promise
to obey all reasonable conditions imposed by the court or magistrate. (3)
The defendant's promise not to depart this state without leave of the court.
(4) Agreement by the defendant to waive extradition if the defendant fails to
appear as required and is apprehended outside of the State of California (5)
The acknowledgment of the defendant that he or she has been informed of
the consequences and penalties applicable to violation of the conditions of
release.
CAL PENAL CODE § 1318 (West Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
5. In re York, 9 Cal. 4th at 1141, 892 P.2d at 808, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 312.
6. Id. at 1141-42, 892 P.2d at 808, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 312. If the statutory lan-
guage is unambiguous, the court need not look further. Id. at 1142, 892 P.2d at 808,
40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 312 (citing Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d 991, 800
P.2d 557, 275 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1990)).
7. Id. at 1142, 892 P.2d at 808, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 312.
8. Id. at 1143-44, 892 P.2d at 809-10, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 313-14. The court turns
to legislative history when the statutory language is unclear. Id. (citing Long Beach
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which the judiciary routinely imposed on defendants, were not related to
assuring the accused's appearance at a subsequent proceeding, but rather
were related to the furtherance of public safety.9 The court, therefore,
concluded that the legislative intent was to give judges and magistrates
broad discretion in imposing "reasonable conditions" including those re-
lated to furthering public safety but not necessarily those related to as-
suring future appearances.I°
The court next turned to petitioners' constitutional argument and
found no historical support for the assertion that the legislature intended
to preclude courts from imposing reasonable conditions that violate a
defendant's constitutional rights." In fact, the court noted that commit-
tee reports analyzing the then-proposed 1988 amendment to section 1318
cited conditions that clearly violated a defendant's constitutional
rights.'" Accordingly, the court ruled that section 1318(a)(2) authorizes a
Police Officers' Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 46 Cal. 3d 736, 759 P.2d 504, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 869 (1988)).
9. Id. The Attorney General sponsored Assembly Bill No. 4282, which was later
passed as the 1988 amendment to California Penal Code § 1318. Id. at 1144, 892 P.2d
at 810, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 314. In a letter to the bill's author, the Attorney General
explained that:
Existing statutes . . . do not address the court's ability to impose conditions
upon [own recognizance] release[s]. As a result, although the judiciary has
routinely imposed limitations on the defendant's behavior as a condition of
own-recognizance release, these conditions vary greatly from case-to-case.
Probably the most common condition is the provo that the defendant refrain
from criminal conduct while on release. In domestic violence and child mo-
lest cases it is common for the court to impose conditions to protect the
victim. And when witness intimidation is a potential issue, the courts usually
fashion conditions designed to protect the witness and the integrity of the
judicial process.
Despite this necessary, common[,J and long-standing practice, the only condi-
tions expressly authorized by statute for own-recognizance release are those
relating to the defendant's appearance ....
AB 4282 will cure this deficiency by expressly providing that the court or
magistrate may condition own-recognizance release on "reasonable condi-
tions." In so doing, this bill will not only provide legislative authority and
guidance for the courts, but will protect defendants from capricious release
conditions.
Id.
The Governor and the chairs of the Assembly Committee on Public Safety, the Senate
Committee on Judiciary, and the Appropriations Committee each received the same
letter, which the Assembly Committee on Public Safety and the Senate Committee on
Judiciary adopted in their analyses of Assembly Bill No. 4282. Id.
10. Id. at 1145, 892 P.2d at 810, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 314.
11. Id. at 1146, 892 P.2d at 811, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 315.
12. Id.
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judge to impose conditions that violate a defendant's constitutional rights
as long as the conditions are reasonable. 3
B. Presumption of Innocence, Right of Privacy, and Right of
Equal Protection
Petitioners further argued that, even if random drug testing and war-
rantless searches and seizures were not barred by statute, they violated
the presumption of innocence, right of privacy, and right of equal protec-
tion. 4
1. Presumption of Innocence
Petitioners' presumption of innocence argument is similar to the one
the United States Supreme Court rejected in Bell v. Wolfish. 5 The Bell
court found that the presumption of innocence applies only to the trial it-
self. 6 Based on Bell, the California Supreme Court decided that, be-
cause conditions imposed upon an own recognizance release do not
affect any presumptions at trial, they do not infringe upon a defendant's
presumption of innocence."
2. Right to Privacy
The court then examined whether imposing random drug testing
and warrantless searches and seizures violated the defendants' right to
be free from unreasonable searches, 8 guaranteed by the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution 9 and article I, section 13 of the
13. Id. at 1146-47, 892 P.2d at 811-12, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 315-16.
14. Id. at 1147, 892 P.2d at 812, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 316.
15. 441 U.S. 520, 532-33 (1979). In Bell, the petitioners were pretrial detainees, as
well as sentenced prisoners, who were challenging various conditions and practices of
New York's Metropolitan Correctional Center. Id. at 526. The Supreme Court found
that the conditions and practices did not unfairly infringe upon the petitioners' right
to a presumption of innocence because they all occurred before trial. Id. at 533. For
a further discussion on bail hearings, see Jonathan P. Hobbs, Criminal Procedure,
Bail Hearings-Domestic Offenses, 26 PAC. L.J. 252 (1995); Shari J. Cohen, Note, Cir-
cumventing Due Process: A Judicial Response to Criminal Recidivism Under the
Bail Reform Act, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 319 (1988).
16. Bell, 441 U.S. at 533.
17. In re York, 9 Cal. 4th at 1148, 892 P.2d at 812-13, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 316-17.
18. Id. at 1148-51, 892 P.2d at 813-15, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 317-19.
19. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
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California Constitution." The court also addressed petitioners' claim
that the conditions violated their rights to privacy and due process of
law guaranteed by the California Constitution, article I, sections 121 and
1 5 ,' respectively.23 The court held that the conditions did not violate
these rights for two reasons. First, because a defendant who is unable
to post bail lacks the reasonable expectation of privacy needed to be
protected from warrantless searches and seizures by being incarcerated,
the conditions at issue do not place greater restrictions on an own recog-
nizance releasee than they would on a defendant who had not secured
his own recognizance release.25 Therefore, no waiver of Fourth Amend-
ment rights was needed.26 Second, the court compared own recogni-
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
20. Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated; and a
warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or affir-
mation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and
things to be seized.
CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 13. For more information on random drug testing and the right of
privacy, see Jennifer L Spaziano, California Supreme Court Survey, 22 PEPP. L REv.
794 (1995) (analyzing Hill v. NCAA); Karen E. Crummy, Urine or You're Out: Student
Athletes' Right of Privacy Stripped in Hill v. NCAA, 29 U.S.F. L REV. 197 (1994).
21. Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution provides: "All people are by
nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying
and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and
pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL CONST. art. I, § 1.
22. Article I, section 15 of the California Constitution provides:
The defendant in a criminal cause has the right to a speedy public trial, to
compel attendance of witnesses in the defendant's behalf, to have the assis-
tance of counsel for the defendant's defense, to be personally present with
counsel, and to be confronted with the witnesses against the defendant. The
Legislature may provide for the deposition of a witness in the presence of
the defendant and the defendant's counsel.
Persons may not twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense, be com-
pelled in a criminal cause to be a witness against themselves, or be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
CAL CONST. art. I, § 15.
23. In re York, 9 Cal. 4th at 1148-51, 892 P.2d at 813-15, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 317-
19.
24. Id. at 1149-51, 892 P.2d at 813-15, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 317-19. For more on
illegal searches and seizures, see 4 B.E. WrrxlN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CAUFORNIA
CmNNAL LAW, Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence §§ 2273-74 (2d ed. 1989 &
Supp. 1995).
25. In re York, 9 Cal. 4th at 1149, 892 P.2d at 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 317.
26. Id.
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zance releasees to people released on probation," who must consent to
a waiver of their Fourth Amendment rights in order to avoid a prison
term. Similarly, an own recognizance releasee must consent to the con-
ditions the court places upon him, or remain incarcerated.28 While the
petitioners in the instant situation had a "considerable incentive" to con-
sent to these conditions, such consent was not "coerced or involuntary,"
and was, therefore, valid.' The court further noted that conditions im-
plicating Fourth Amendment rights must still satisfy the reasonableness
element of California Penal Code section 1318(a)(2)."
3. Equal Protection
Lastly, the court examined whether petitioners' right to equal pro-
tection was violated by forcing them to give up their Fourth Amendment
rights simply because they could not afford bail, while those who did
post bail retained those same rights.' The court stated that a judge or
magistrate may impose these reasonable conditions upon any own re-
cognizance releasee, regardless of his financial status.32 In addition, the
court stated that the clear intent of the legislature was to "further public
safety," not to "discriminate against indigent defendants. " ' Therefore,
petitioners failed to establish that applying the conditions to own recog-
nizance releasees violates equal protection under the laws.'
Because the supreme court determined that the conditions imposed
upon the petitioners' own recognizance release were reasonable and did
27. Id. at 1150-51, 892 P.2d at 814-15, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 318-19.
28. Id. at 1150, 892 P.2d at 814, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 318. For information on house
arrest as an alternative to confmement and conditions placed upon the house arrest,
see Christian A. Ameri, Crimes; Home Detention Programs-Alternative to Confine-
ment, 26 PAC. L.J. 413 (1995).
29. In re York, 9 Cal. 4th at 1150, 892 P.2d at 814, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 318.
30. Id. at 1150-51, 892 P.2d at 814, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 318.
31. Id. at 1151-52, 892 P.2d at 815, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 319. The court stated that
it assumed petitioners were correct in asserting that random drug testing and war-
rantless searches and seizures could not be imposed upon a defendant who posts
bail without addressing the issue. Id. at 1152, 892 P.2d at 815, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
319; cf. 20 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2587 (1985 & Supp. 1995) (listing factors
the judge or magistrate considers when deciding between own recognizance release
and setting of reasonable bail).
32. In re York, 9 Cal. 4th at 1152, 892 P.2d at 815, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 319.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1153, 892 P.2d at 815, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 319.
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not unfairly infringe on their rights, the court affirmed the court of
appeal's judgment."
III. IMPACT
Before the 1988 amendment to California Penal Code section 1318,
courts routinely held that any condition placed upon a defendant re-
leased on his own recognizance had to be reasonably related to insuring
appearance at subsequent court proceedings. 6 The 1988 amendment,
however, permitted courts to impose any "reasonable conditions" upon
the releasees 7 The California Supreme Court made it clear in In re
York that these conditions included warrantless searches and seizures
and random drug tests, as long as it was reasonable under the circum-
stances.' In doing so, the court upheld the court of appeal's decision
that a judge or magistrate must inquire into the "specific facts and cir-
cumstances of the defendant's case" in determining whether to impose
such conditions.' Additionally, the court upheld the ruling that a court
cannot unilaterally impose such restrictions on all defendants accused of
drug related crimes.4" Therefore, even though the court held that impos-
ing such conditions is permissible, a court is limited as to what extent
and to when it may impose these conditions.4 '
IV. CONCLUSION
In In re York, the California Supreme Court held that random drug
tests and warrantless searches and seizures are reasonable conditions to
be placed upon the own recognizance release of a defendant and,
therefore, do not violate his rights to a presumption of innocence, priva-
cy, or equal protection under the laws.42 However, this standard only ap-
plies if a court makes some inquiry into the specific facts of the
35. Id. at 1153, 892 P.2d at 816, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 320.
36. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Municipal Court, 124 Cal. App. 3d 1083, 177 Cal. Rptr.
683 (1981) (holding that conditioning release on signing a written declaration not to
"trespass, blockade, or fail to disperse" at a nuclear power plant was an abuse of
discretion); Van Atta v. Scott, 27 Cal. 3d 424, 613 P.2d 210, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1980)
(examining the constitutionality of the own-recognizance system); People v.
McCaughey 261 Cal. App. 2d 131, 67 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1968) (willful failure to appear
case). See generally 20 CAL JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2624 (1985); 4 B.E. WrrIaN &
NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAw, Proceedings Before Trial § 2035 (2d
ed. 1989) (discussing decisions involving the "reasonably related" standard).
37. See 20 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2624 (Supp. 1995).
38. In re York, 9 Cal. 4th at 1137-38, 892 P.2d at 805, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 309.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1139, 1153, 892 P.2d at 806, 816, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 310, 320.
41. Id. at 1137-38, 892 P.2d at 805, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 309.
42. Id. at 1145-53, 892 P.2d at 811-15, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 315-19.
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defendant's case to justify the implication of specific constitutional
rights.
MARC S. HANISH
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
An injunction requiring protesters to demonstrate
across the street from an abortion clinic withstands
constitutional scrutiny under the new test estab-
lished by the United States Supreme Court in
Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 114 S.Ct. 2516
(1994), where that injunction is content neutral,
serves significant state interests, leaves adequate
alternative avenues of communication, and burdens
protesters' First Amendment rights no more than is
necessary to serve state interests:
Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo v. Williams.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reviewing the case on remand, the California Supreme Court in
Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo v. Williams' re-examined its earlier
holding' in light of the new test for the constitutionality of injunctions
restricting First Amendment rights.3 The United States Supreme Court
articulated the new test in Madsen v. Women's Health Center.4 In its
first review of the Williams case, the California Supreme Court applied
the existing four-part test for determining the constitutionality of time,
place and manner speech restrictions.5 On the basis of that test, the
court held the injunction constitutionally valid? The United States Su-
1. 10 Cal. 4th 1009, 898 P.2d 402, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 88, petition for cert. filed, 64
U.S.LW. 3287 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1995). Justice Arabian authored the majority opinion in
which Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices Mosk, Baxter, George and Strankman con-
curred. Id. at 1011-25, 898 P.2d at 403-13, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 88-99. Justice Kennard
wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 1025-40, 898 P.2d at 413-22, 43 Cal. Rptr
2d at 99-109 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
2. See Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo v. Williams, 7 Cal. 4th 860, 873 P.2d
1224, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 629, vacated, 115 S. Ct. 413 (1994).
3. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states in pertinent part
that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The Constitution
and its amendments are made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which states that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally Russel W. Galloway, Basic Free
Speech Analysis, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 883 (1991) (outlining the parameters of the
First Amendment right to free speech).
4. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
5. Williams, 7 Cal. 4th at 866-67, 873 P.2d at 1227, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632; see
Williams, 10 Cal. 4th at 1014, 898 P.2d at 405, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 91; Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (setting forth the pre-Madsen test); Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (same).
6. Williams, 10 Cal. 4th at 1015, 898 P.2d at 406, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 92. See
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preme Court's subsequent decision in Madsen, however, distinguished
between injunctions and generally applicable ordinances and established
a "slightly stricter" constitutional test for injunctions.7 Applying this new
standard, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed the Court of Appeal's
decision and held that the permanent injunction imposed by the Wil-
liams trial court withstood the heightened constitutional scrutiny man-
dated by Madsen.'
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1990, Planned Parenthood operated a family planning clinic in
Vallejo, California.9 In response to increasingly disruptive anti-abortion
protests held directly outside the clinic, Planned Parenthood sought an
injunction limiting the protestors' activities to the sidewalk across the
street from the clinic.'0 The trial court ultimately granted a permanent
generally 7 B.E. WrrMN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 286 (9th
ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the lower court's decision in Williams, 7 Cal. 4th
at 860, 873 P.2d at 1224, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 629).
7. Williams, 10 Cal. 4th at 1011, 898 P.2d at 403-04, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89-90
(citing Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526-27). See generally 7 B.E. WrrIN, SUMMARY OF CALI-
FORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 286 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995) (discussing
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2516); Mathew D. Staver, Injunctive Relief and the Madsen
Test, 14 ST. Loins U. PUB. L. REV. 465 (1995) (explaining the Madsen decision's effect
on the distinction between injunctions and ordinances for free speech purposes).
8. Williams, 10 Cal. 4th at 1025, 898 P.2d at 412-13, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98-99. See
generally 13 CAL JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 260 (1992 & Supp. 1995) (outlining
reasonable restrictions allowed on the expression of speech).
9. Williams, 10 Cal. 4th at 1012, 898 P.2d at 404, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 90.
10. Id. at 1013, 898 P.2d at 403, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89. Planned Parenthood initial-
ly obtained a temporary restraining order from the trial court forbidding the protes-
tors to harass "any person entering or leaving the building" and limited the
protestor's picketing activities to the sidewalk in front of the building. Id. at 1013,
898 P.2d at 404, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 90. The number of protestors allowed to picket
on the sidewalk in front of the clinic was later limited to four by a preliminary in-
junction. Id.
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injunction," thereby relegating the protestors' activities to a sidewalk
across the street.2
The California Court of Appeal reviewed the injunction and found
the "place" restriction constitutional. 3 The California Supreme Court
later affirmed the appellate court's decision. 4 The United States Su-
preme Court subsequently vacated that judgment and remanded the case
for reconsideration in light of the heightened scrutiny set forth in
Madsen.'"
III. TREATMENT
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Arabian's opinion began by reviewing the California Supreme
Court's analysis in the first Williams decision. In reaching its decision,
11. The permanent injunction explicitly prohibited the protestors from:
(1) blocking any entrance or exit to the clinic building; (2) recording the li-
cense numbers of cars entering or leaving the clinic; (3) photographing any
person entering or leaving the clinic building; (4) referring, in oral statements
while at the clinic site, to physicians, staff or clients as "murdering" or "mur-
derers," "killing" or "killers," or to children or babies being "killed" or "mur-
dered" by anyone in the clinic building in the presence of children under 12;
and (5) shouting at or touching physicians, staff or patients entering or leav-
ing the clinic or maldng noise that could be heard inside the premises.
Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo v. Williams, 7 Cal. 4th 860, 867, 873 P.2d 1224, 1227,
30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 629, 632, vacated, 115 S. Ct. 413 (1994).
12. Williams, 10 Cal. 4th at 1013, 898 P.2d at 405, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 91. The
injunction stated in pertinent part, "-[all picketing, demonstrating, or counseling at
the PLANNED PARENTHOOD building shall oniy take place along the public side-
walk across the street from PLANNED PARENTHOOD building.'" Id. at 1031, 898 P.2d
at 416, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (emphasis added by the
court) (quoting the trial court's order). In granting the injunction, the trial court ob-
served:
[The protestors] (1) confronted and intimidated women seeking the clinic's
services and forced plastic replicas of fetuses and "counseling" upon the
clinic's patients and staff; (2) interfered with or obstructed entrance to and
exit from the clinic; (3) pursued patients to their cars and public transporta-
tion to distribute literature and plastic fetuses; and (4) caused some of the
women seeking medical services to become emotionally distraught.
Id. at 1013, 898 P.2d at 404-05, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 90-91.
13. Id. at 1014, 898 P.2d at 405, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 91.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1009, 898 P.2d at 402, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 88; see Williams, 115 S. Ct.
413, 413 (1994).
16. Williams, 10 Cal. 4th at 1014-15, 898 P.2d at 405-06, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 91-92.
For a comprehensive discussion of the California Supreme Court's first holding in
Wi//iams, see Robert E. Sabido, California Supreme Court Survey, 22 PEPP. L. REV.
1190, 1190-98 (1995).
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the court asserted that it had correctly applied the United States Su-
preme Court's four-part test for determining whether ordinances and
injunctions regulating free speech are constitutional.'7 The test required
such speech restrictions to be content neutral,'8 serve a significant gov-
ernmental interest,'9 be "sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve the ex-
pressed governmental interests,"" and leave open "adequate alternative
avenues of communication."2 Justice Arabian emphasized that the trial
court's injunction satisfied the constitutional criteria and that the
injunction's place restriction had been properly upheld. 2
The court then turned its attention to the new Madsen test.'3 In its
analysis, the court noted that the new test was designed primarily for
injunctions.24 Further, the only significant difference between the old
test and the Madsen test is the question of whether an injunction is nar-
rowly tailored.2" The court observed that, according to Madsen, injunc-
tions pose a greater threat to First Amendment rights than ordinances,
necessitating "a somewhat more stringent application" of constitutional
principles.2" Thus, the narrowly tailored prong was effectively trans-
formed by Madsen into a question of "whether the challenged provisions
of the injunction burden[ed] no more speech than necessary to serve a
significant government interest."27
17. Williams, 10 Cal. 4th at 1014-15, 898 P.2d at 405, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 91; see
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (stating that the government
may place restrictions on protected speech provided the restrictions "are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information" (citation omitted)); Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (outlining the
four-part standard of constitutional validity).
18. Williams, 10 Cal. 4th at 1014, 898 P.2d at 405, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 91.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1015, 898 P.2d at 406, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 92.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1015-19, 898 P.2d at 406-08, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 92-94.
24. Id. at 1017, 898 P.2d at 407, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 93. The court observed that
the Supreme Court was concerned by the "(greater risks of censorship and discrimi-
natory application)" that injunctions posed in comparison to "(general ordinances.)"
Id. (quoting Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2524 (1994)).
25. Id.
26. Id. (quoting Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524).
27. Id. (quoting Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525) (emphasis added).
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The court next subjected the facts of Williams to the heightened
scrutiny of the new standard.' The court observed that in both Madsen
and Williams, "the trial court was confronted with a relatively restricted
geographic area in front of the family planning clinic, physical harass-
ment of patients occurring within these narrow confines, and an earlier
injunction that had not proved to be successful."' The trial court was
thus forced to balance the interests of the state in maintaining patient
safety and accessibility of the thoroughfare against the protestors' First
Amendment rights.' The court found that the injunction succeeded in
keeping the roadway clear and still allowed the protestors to communi-
cate their views, albeit at a distance of sixty feet." Applying the Madsen
test, the Williams majority concluded that the place restriction burdened
no more speech than was absolutely necessary to accomplish the
government's interests and, therefore, "more than ... [met Madsen's]
heightened standard."32 Accordingly, the California Supreme Court up-
held its earlier decision.3
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Borrowing heavily from her earlier dissent in the first Williams
decision,' Justice Kennard's lengthy dissent asserted that the trial
court's injunction "was much broader than necessary to accomplish its
objective."' She further argued that the preliminary injunction had al-
ready accomplished the objectives of the later, more restrictive perma-
nent injunction.' Justice Kennard also pointed out that by limiting the
28. Id. at 1019-25, 898 P.2d at 408-12, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94-98.
29. Id. at 1024, 898 P.2d at 412, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98. The court observed that in
both Madsen and Williams the protestors "impeded access to the clinic, ...blocked
traffic, . . . physically stalked patients attempting to enter the clinic" and continued
to do so even after the issuance of preliminary, less restrictive injunctions. Id. at
1020, 898 P.2d at 409, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95.
30. Id. at 1024, 898 P.2d at 412, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98.
31. Id. The court took judicial notice that the distance between the clinic and the
far sidewalk was approximately 60 feet. Id. at 1021, 898 P.2d at 409-10, 43 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 95-96. The buffer zone created by the injunction in Madsen was 36 feet. Id. at
1021, 898 P.2d at 409, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95 (citing Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526). The
court deemed this 24 foot difference negligible. Id. at 1021, 898 P.2d at 409-10, 43
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95-96.
32. Id. at 1024, 898 P.2d at 411, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97.
33. Id. at 1025, 898 P.2d at 412-13, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98-99.
34. See Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo v. Williams, 7 Cal. 4th 860, 883-94, 873
P.2d 1224, 1238, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 629, 643-50 (Kennard, J., dissenting), vacated, 115 S.
Ct. 413 (1994).
35. Williams, 10 Cal. 4th at 1026, 898 P.2d at 413, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
36. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard identified these objectives as "pro-
tecting the health and safety of the clinic's patients, . . . providing unimpeded public
1030
[Vol. 23: 1005, 1996] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
protestors to the sidewalk across the street from the clinic, the injunc-
tion prohibited expressive activities "in an undefined and potentially
infinite area outside the designated zone," in effect "walling speech in
rather than out.""
Justice Kennard also argued that significant differences existed be-
tween the facts of Madsen and Williams.' First, unlike Madsen, the
irunction in Williams was preceded by an effective, less restrictive in-
junction.39 In addition, the Williams protestors were restricted to the
other side of a wide, noisy thoroughfare, from which their message had
to be "heard over the roar of traffic."4 ° Finally, Justice Kennard con-
cluded that "the trial court's permanent injunction burdened more speech
than was necessary to protect the clinic's staff and patients, and thus
violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution."4'
IV. CONCLUSION
In Madsen, the United States Supreme Court established a stricter
test for constitutionality than that initially applied by the California Su-
preme Court in Williams.42 Prior to Madsen, precedent required the
court to determine whether the time, place, and manner restrictions on
picketing and leafletting were content neutral, narrowly tailored mea-
sures that served significant state interests and left open adequate alter-
native avenues of communication. 3 The standard now applicable in Cal-
ifornia requires any such injunction to "burden no more speech than nec-
essary."'
access to the clinic's facilities, and . . . ensuring the free flow of traffic on the street
and sidewalk in front of the clinic." Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 1027, 898 P.2d at 413, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 1026-38, 898 P.2d at 417-21, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103-07 (Kennard, J., dis-
senting).
39. Id. at 1038, 898 P.2d at 421, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 107 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
40. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
41. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 1012, 898 P.2d at 403-04, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89-90. Compare Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2526 (1994) with Planned Parenthood Shasta-
Diablo v. Williams, 7 Cal. 4th 860, 888-94, 873 P.2d 1224, 1228-36, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d
629, 63341, vacated, 115 S. Ct. 413 (1994).
43. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (setting forth the
pre-Madsen test); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984) (same).
44. Williams, 10 Cal. 4th at 1017, 898 P.2d at 407, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 93 (quoting
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526). See generally 7 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW, Constitutional Law § 286C (Supp. 1995) (discussing Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at
1031
In the Williams case on remand, the California Supreme Court ren-
dered its interpretation of the new Madsen standard. Writing for the six
member majority, Justice Arabian described the new standard as only
"slightly" higher than the earlier test45 and then affirmed the court's ear-
lier decision.4" Thus, the decision in Williams may signal the California
Supreme Court's continued willingness to uphold injunctions limiting free
speech in the interest of protecting the rights of women seeking abor-
tions."7
L. Scor BARTELL
2516).
45. Williams, 10 Cal. 4th at 1012, 898 P.2d at 403-04, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89-90.
46. Id. at 1025, 898 P.2d at 412-13, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98-99.
47. See Jennifer Wohlstadter, Note, Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.: The
Constitutionality of Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones, 25 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 543
(1995) (discussing Madsen's potential effect on protests near abortion centers).
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IV. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Enhancement of a defendant's sentence for posses-
sion of a weapon during the commission of a drug
offense is valid even if the defendant was not
present at the time the drugs and weapon were
seized, as long as the defendant knew of the weapon,
the weapon was near the drugs, and the defendant
could have used the weapon in furtherance of the
drug offense: People v. Bland.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Bland,' the California Supreme Court addressed
whether California Penal Code section 12002,2 a sentence enhancement
provision for possessing a weapon in the commission of a felony, applied
to the defendant when he was not present at the time officers seized co-
caine and a weapon from his bedroom.' The supreme court reversed the
1. 10 Cal. 4th 991, 898 P.2d 391, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (1995). Justice Kennard
wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Arabian,
Baxter, and George concurred. Id. at 995-1006, 898 P.2d at 393-401, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 79-87. Justice Werdegar wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 1006-08, 898 P.2d at
401-02, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87-88 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
2. California Penal Code § 12022(a)(1) provides in relevant part:
[Any person who is armed with a firearm in the commission or attempted
commission of a felony shall, upon conviction of that felony or attempted
felony, in addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the
felony or attempted felony of which he or she has been convicted, be pun-
ished by an additional term of one year .... This additional term shall
apply to any person who is a principal in the commission or attempted com-
mission of a felony . . . whether or not the person is personally armed with
a firearm.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 12022(a)(1) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
Penal Code § 12022(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part: "If the firearm is an assault
weapon ... the additional term . . . shall be three years . . " CAL PEN. CODE
§ 12022(a)(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). See generally 18 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law
§§ 1628-1633 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (providing a general overview of sentence enhance-
ments for armed felonies).
3. Bland, 10 Cal. 4th at 995, 898 P.2d at 393, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79. The defen-
dant, Marvin Bland, was sitting in a police car outside of his house while officers
searched his home for stolen auto parts. Id. at 995, 898 P.2d at 394, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 80. The search produced a bag of rock cocaine, found in the defendant's bedroom
closet, and unloaded firearms, including an assault weapon, found under the
defendant's bed. Id. The jury convicted the defendant for cocaine possession with
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appellate decision, upholding the trial court's decision to add three years
to the defendant's sentence for possessing a weapon in the commission
of a drug offense.4 The California Supreme Court held that when
firearms and drugs are kept near each other in a place frequented by the
defendant, sufficient evidence exists "that the defendant was 'armed with
a firearm in the commission' of the felony drug offense."'
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Kennard, writing for the majority, first considered the legis-
lative intent in enacting, Penal Code sections 12022 and 12022.5,6 which
impose an increased sentence for defendants who were armed or used a
firearm in the commission of a felony.' The court noted that the sen-
tence enhancement provisions were enacted to deter offenders from
using firearms in the commission of crimes because the use of firearms
creates a risk of death or injury. The court emphasized the distinction
between being armed and actually using a firearm and determined that
being armed does not require actual possession of the firearm on the
body."° The court further advanced the notion that someone can be
armed if a weapon is available for offensive or defensive use."1
intent to distribute. Id. Three years were added to Bland's sentence because the jury
determined that under § 12022, he was armed with a weapon during the commission
of the drug offense. Id. at 996, 898 P.2d at 394, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 80. The court of
appeal affirmed Bland's drug convictions, but rescinded the three-year enhancement.
Id. The court of appeal reasoned that there was no way that the defendant could
have reached the weapons because he was outside of the house when the drugs and
weapons were seized. Id.
4. Id. at 1006, 898 P.2d at 401, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87.
5. Id.
6. California Penal Code § 12022.5(a) provides:
[A]ny person who personally uses a firearm in the commission or attempted
commission of a felony shall, upon conviction of that felony or attempted
felony, in addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the
felony or attempted felony of which he or she has been convicted, be pun-
ished by an additional term of imprisonment in the state prison for 3, 4, 5,
or 10 years ....
CAL. PEN. CODE § 12022.5(a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
7. Bland, 10 Cal. 4th at 996, 898 P.2d at 394, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 80.
8. Id. at 996, 898 P.2d at 394-95, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 80-81; see 18 CAL. JUR. 3D
Criminal Law § 1628 (1984 & Supp. 1995) (maintaining that the sentence enhance-
ment statute is constitutional because the desire of the legislature to deter the use of
firearms in the commission of felonies is reasonable).
9. Bland, 10 Cal. 4th at 996-97, 898 P.2d at 395, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 81.
10. Id. at 997, 898 P.2d at 395, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 81.
11. Id. (citing People v. Mendival, 2 Cal. App. 4th 562, 573, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 566,
574 (1992) (finding that the ready access to a weapon constitutes being armed)).
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Next, the court focused on whether the defendant was armed in the
instant case. 2 The court reasoned that defendant Bland could have used
the firearm at any time while he possessed the drugs. 3 Additionally, the
drugs were kept in close proximity to the gun. As a result, the jury could
reasonably infer that at some point the defendant had been physically
present in the room and had ready access to the gun to aid him in com-
mitting the drug offense. 4
The court then discussed section 12022(a)(2), which provides for a
three-year sentence enhancement for commission of an armed felony."
The court validated the enhancement because Bland had the gun avail-
able to assist him during the entire time he possessed the drugs. 6
The court resolved that the legislative intent, "to deter those en-
gaged in felonies from creating a risk of death or injury by having a fire-
arm at the scene of the crime,"'" is consistent with the finding that a
firearm kept near drugs creates a risk of harm because the defendant
may use the weapon to protect himself from the police or the drugs from
theft. 8
Finally, the court held that Bland was armed in the commission of a
felony since the gun was found near the drugs and the jury reasonably
inferred three main points. First, Bland knew the gun was in his bed-
12. Bland, 10 Cal. 4th at 1000, 898 P.2d at 397, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83.
13. Id.
14. Id.; see Rory Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J.
1029, 1045 n.65 (1995) ("It is fair to consider narcotics and weapons offenses togeth-
er because in reality they are often committed together and charged together.").
15. Id.; see 3 B.E. WITGN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment for Crime § 1500
(2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1995) ("[Since the [sentence enhancement] statutes do not cre-
ate crimes, neither double jeopardy nor double punishment is involved when the
punishment for another crime is enhanced because of weapon use in its commis-
sion.").
16. Bland, 10 Cal. 4th at 1003, 898 P.2d at 398, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84; see 18 CAL.
JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 1629 (1984 & Supp. 1995) (explaining that the additional
punishment for possessing a firearm must run consecutively rather than concurrently
to the term imposed for the felony conviction); 3 B.E. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
LAw, Punishment for Crime § 1501 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1995) (noting that the
court does have some discretion in choosing among the term lengths set forth in
12022(b)). Contra Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the
Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REv. 61 (1993) (criticizing
mandatory sentencing and the displacement of judicial discretion).
17. Bland, 10 Cal. 4th at 1001-02, 898 P.2d at 398, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1003-04, 898 P.2d at 399, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85.
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room.2" Second, the firearm's presence was not accidental or coinciden-
tal." Third, at some point during Bland's possession of the drugs, the
gun was available to secure that possession."
B. Justice Werdegar's Concurring Opinion
Justice Werdegar wrote separately to reject the majority's notion of
establishing a general rule that weapon proximity can deem a defendant
armed.' Justice Werdegar asserted that proximity should be only one
factor in evaluating the totality of the circumstances when deciding
whether the evidence warrants sentence enhancement.
24
Ill. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
In People v. Stiltner,2" the court stated that "[a] person is armed
with a deadly weapon when he simply carries a weapon or has it avail-
able for use in either offense or defense."26 In People v. Nelums,27 the
supreme court further relaxed the standard for sentence enhancement
when it determined that the subject weapon need not be loaded or oper-
able.s
In Bland, the California Supreme Court continued to expand the
sentence enhancement provision by holding that when drugs and a fire-
arm are in close proximity, the defendant knows of the firearm, and the
defendant could have used the firearm in furtherance of the drug of-
fense, the defendant may be subject to California Penal Code section
12022 sentence enhancement.' 9 Bland broadens the meaning of being
20. Id. at 1002, 898 P.2d at 399, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1002-04, 898 P.2d at 399-400, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85-86. The court re-
marked that the jury could decide that the defendant was armed even though the
gun was unloaded. Id. at 1005, 898 P.2d at 400, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86. The court
further declared that the omission of the word "knowingly" in the jury instructions,
regarding access to the firearm, does not require setting the sentence enhancement
aside since it is improbable that the jury would have otherwise reached a different
conclusion. Id. at 1005-06, 898 P.2d at 400-01, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86-87.
23. Id. at 1007-08, 898 P.2d at 402, 43 Cal Rptr. 2d at 88 (Werdegar, J., concur-
ring).
24. Id. at 1008, 898 P.2d at 402, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 88 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
25. 132 Cal. App. 3d 216, 182 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1982).
26. Id. at 230, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 797-98 (citing People v. Reaves, 42 Cal. App. 3d
852, 856-57, 177 Cal. Rptr. 163, 166 (1974)).
27. 31 Cal. 3d 355, 644 P.2d 201, 182 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1982).
28. Id. at 359, 644 P.2d at 204, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 518.
29. Bland, 10 Cal. 4th at 1002-03, 898 P.2d at 399, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84 (1995).
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armed in the commission of a felony and gives prosecutors new ammu-
nition for prosecuting drug offenders."
LORI L. PROUDFIT
30. See generally Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United
States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for
a Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185 (1993) (ex-
amining the federal sentence enhancement guidelines); Susan N. Herman, The Tail
that Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289 (1992) (same); David R.
Truman, The Jets and Sharks are Dead: State Statutory Responses to Criminal Street
Gangs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 683 (1995) (emphasizing California law in discussing sen-
tence enhancement laws and gang activity in various states).
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B. A court may bifurcate the jury trial of an alleged re-
peat offender into two proceedings: one, to deter-
mine whether the defendant is guilty of the current-
ly charged crime, and; two, to determine whether
the defendant was previously convicted:
People v. Calderon.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Calderon,' the California Supreme Court granted re-
view to determine whether a court may bifurcate the jury trial of an
alleged repeat offender into two proceedings: one, to determine whether
the defendant is guilty of the currently charged crime, and; two, to deter-
mine whether the offender was previously convicted.2 The court held
that the trial court may bifurcate an alleged repeat offender's jury trial in
this manner. Additionally, the supreme court held that a trial court
1. 9 cal. 4th 69, 885 P.2d 83, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 333 (1994). Justice George
authored the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Kennard,
Arabian, Baxter and Werdegar concurred. Id. at 71-82, 885 P.2d at 86-93, 36 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 335-42. Justice Mask wrote a separate opinion in which he concurred with the
majority's legal analysis but dissented to the majority's disposition of the case. Id. at
82, 885 P.2d at 93, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 342 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
2. Id. at 71-72, 885 P.2d at 86, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335. In Calderon, the prosecu-
tion charged the defendant with second-degree burglary after the police caught him
walking out of a convenience store without paying for two cases of beer. Id. at 72-
73, 885 P.2d at 86-87, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335-36. The prosecution sought to increase
the defendant's potential sentence under California law, by alleging that the defendant
suffered a prior conviction for attempted robbery. Id. at 72, 885 P.2d at 86, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 336.
The defendant made a pre-trial motion to bifurcate the trial into two proceed-
ings. Id. In the first proceeding, the jury was to determine whether the defendant
was guilty of second degree burglary; while in the second proceeding, the jury was
to determine whether the defendant had been previously convicted of attempted rob-
bery. Id. The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant then admitted that he
had been previously convicted of attempted robbery. Id. This admission came before
the start of the jury trial. Id.
During the trial, the court warned the defendant that it would allow the prose-
cution to impeach his testimony "with evidence that he had been convicted of a
'theft-related felony.'" Id. at 73, 885 P.2d at 87, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 336. Thus, the
defendant admitted during his testimony that he had been previously convicted of "a
theft-related felony." Id. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the defendant was
sentenced to three years in state prison for the burglary charge. Id. In addition, his
three-year sentence was increased by one year, because of his previous attempted
robbery conviction. Id. The court of appeal affirmed both the conviction and the
sentence enhancement. Id.
3. Id. at 75, 885 P.2d at 88, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 337-38.
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should bifurcate the trial only if a unitary trial will unduly prejudice the
defendant.4
II. TREATMENT
A. The Majority Opinion
1. A Trial Court Has the Discretion to Bifurcate the Trial Into Two
Separate Proceedings
California law enhances the punishment of a convicted defendant if
"the prosecution alleges and proves that the defendant has suffered one
or more prior convictions."5 When a defendant denies an alleged prior
conviction, California Penal Code section 1025 states that the jury trying
the case must determine both the guilt of the defendant and the truthful-
ness of the prior conviction.6
4. Id. at 77-78, 885 P.2d at 90, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 339.
5. Id. at 71-72, 885 P.2d at 86, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335 (quoting People v.
Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th 580, 585, 853 P.2d 1093, 1094, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 638, 639 (1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1101 (1994)); see CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f) ("Any prior felony
conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding . . . shall subsequently be used
without limitation for purposes of ... enhancement of sentence in any criminal pro-
ceeding."); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995) ("[Any
person convicted of a serious felony . . . shall receive, in addition to the sentence
imposed by the court for the present offense, a five-year enhancement for each such
prior conviction . . . . "); CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995) (en-
hancing punishment for defendants previously convicted of violent felonies); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11370.2 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995) (imposing three-year
sentence enhancement for criminals previously convicted of violating California con-
trolled substance laws). See generally 22 CAL JuR. 3D Criminal Law § 3370 (1985 &
Supp. 1995) (stating that the purpose for enhancing the punishment of a repeat of-
fender is to "seek some other method to curb his propensities and to deter others in
like situations from committing subsequent offenses . . . [and] to diminish the oppor-
tunities for evil deeds . . . by removing them from the theater of free men for longer
periods."); 3 B.E. WrrIuN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punish-
ment For Crimes § 1492 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1995) (listing California Penal Code
sections that enhance the sentences of repeat offenders).
For a criticism of sentence enhancement for repeat offenders, see Markus D.
Dubber, Note, The Unprincipled Punishment of Repeat Offenders: A Critique of
California's Habitual Offender Criminal Statute, 43 STAN. L. REV. 193 (1990).
6. California Penal Code section 1025 provides in pertinent part:
When a defendant is charged ... with having suffered a previous convic-
tion . . . he must be asked whether he has suffered such conviction .... If
he answers that he has not . . . the question whether or not he has suffered
such previous conviction must be tried by the jury which tries the issue
upon the plea of not guilty.
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The California Supreme Court conceded that nothing in section
1025's language authorizes a trial court to bifurcate the twofold determi-
nation of guilt and truth of a prior conviction into separate proceedings.!
Nevertheless, the court found implied authority to bifurcate in section
1044,8 which grants a trial court broad discretion to conduct criminal
trial proceedings in a manner that most "expeditiously and effectively"
arrives at the truth.9 Therefore, the court held that a trial court has the
discretion to bifurcate the trial in order to more "expeditiously and effec-
tively" determine the truth.'0
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1025 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995). See generally 22 CAL JUR. 3D
Criminal Law § 3384 (1985 & Supp. 1995) ("In case of a plea of not guilty, the issue
of a prior conviction is tried by the same jury that determines the defendant's guilt
respecting the primary offense."); 3 B.E. WITICN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA
CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment For Crimes § 1527(2)(a) (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1995) ("If
the defendant pleaded not guilty and went to trial on the main offense, the issue of
prior conviction is submitted to that same jury.").
7. People v. Calderon, 9 Cal. 4th 69, 74, 885 P.2d 83, 87-88, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 333,
337 (1994). In addition, the court noted that the United States Supreme Court has
held that a defendant's due process rights are not violated merely because the trial
court failed to bifurcate the determination of the defendant's guilt and the
truthfulness of an alleged prior conviction. Id. at 75, 885 P.2d at 88, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 338 (citing Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 568 (1967)). In Spencer, the Court not-
ed that "[tiwo-part jury trials . .. have never been compelled by this Court as a
matter of constitutional law, or even as a matter of federal procedure." Spencer, 385
U.S. at 568.
8. California Penal Code § 1044 provides in pertinent part that "[ilt shall be the
duty of the judge to control all proceedings during the trial . . . with a view to the
expeditious and effective ascertainment of the truth regarding the matter involved."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1044 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995). See generally 21 CAL. Jun. 3D
Criminal Law § 2925 (1985 & Supp. 1995) ("In the progress of a criminal trial, the
trial judge has considerable discretion over the proper conduct of the trial.").
9. Calderon, 9 Cal. 4th at 74-75, 885 P.2d at 88, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 337-38. The
court noted that the United States Supreme Court considered a bifurcated trial "prob-
ably the fairest" whenever the jury must determine both the defendant's guilt and the
truth of an alleged prior conviction. Id. at 75, 885 P.2d at 88, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 338
(citing Spencer, 385 U.S. at 567-68 (suggesting that the Court would support a two-
stage jury trial if it had to decide the issue "in a legislative or rule-making context")).
10. Id. at 75, 885 P.2d at 88, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 337-38. See generally 22 CAL. JUR.
3D Criminal Law § 3384 (1985 & Supp. 1995) ("It has been held that, whenever
charged prior convictions are in issue . . . the defendant is entitled to a bifurcated
proceeding in which the jury is not informed of his prior convictions . . . until it has
found him guilty of the primary offense."); 5 B.E. WITIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALI-
FORNIA CRIMINAL LAw, Trial § 2833 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1995) (discussing California
cases that address trial bifurcation of an alleged repeat offender).
The court compared the approaches that other jurisdictions have taken, and
noted that the judge, not the jury, decided the truth of an alleged prior conviction in
approximately half of the states, the District of Columbia, and in the federal system.
Calderon, 9 Cal. 4th at 76, 885 P.2d at 89, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 338; see, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 13A-5-10(a) (1994) ("The court may conduct a hearing upon the issues of
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2. A Court Should Exercise Its Discretion and Bifurcate The Trial
When a Unitary Trial Will Unduly Prejudice the Defendant
According to the court, a unitary trial to determine both the
defendant's guilt and the truth of an alleged prior conviction may unduly
prejudice a defendant and thus, adversely affect the determination of
truth." The court explained that a unitary trial allows the jury to hear
evidence relating to an alleged prior conviction before the jury deter-
mines the defendant's guilt in the currently charged offense. 2 Conse-
quently, the jury may erroneously find the defendant guilty of the cur-
rently charged offense merely because the defendant was involved in
previous offenses. 3
The court listed factors that a trial court should weigh when deter-
mining how strong the danger of prejudice will be in a unitary trial. 4
According to the court, a trial court should consider the similarity be-
tween the currently charged offense and the prior conviction, 5 the
whether a defendant is a repeat or habitual offender . . . ."); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-
111(c)(1) (1989 & Supp. 1995) ("The hearing [to determine the truth of an alleged
prior conviction] shall be before the court without a jury . . . ."); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 775.084(3)(a) (West 1995) ("In a separate proceeding, the court shall determine if
the defendant is a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender."); ILL
ANN. STAT. Ch. 720, par. 5/33B-2(a) (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995) ("The court
shall hear and determine . . . [the] issue [of an alleged prior conviction] and shall
make a written finding thereon."); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.20(9) (McKinney 1994
& Supp. 1995) ("Such a hearing [to determine the truth of an alleged prior convic-
tion] shall be before the court without a jury . . ").
The court also observed that at least 16 of the states that permit the jury to
decide the truth of an alleged prior conviction statutorily require bifurcation.
Caleron, 9 Cal. 4th at 76-77, 885 P.2d at 89, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 339; see, e.g., OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 860 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995) ("[D]uring the trial of the case,
no reference shall be made nor evidence received of prior offenses .... If the ver-
dict be guilty of the offense charged .... evidence of prior offenses shall be re-
ceived."); TEX. CriM. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 36.01, 37.07 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995)
("When prior convictions are alleged for purposes of enhancement only ... that
portion of the indictment or information reciting such convictions shall not be read
until the hearing on punishment is held.").
11. Calderon, 9 Cal. 4th at 75, 885 P.2d at 88, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 337.
12. Id.
13. Id. (quoting People v. Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d 86, 109, 753 P.2d 37, 50, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 245, 258 ("Evidence that involves crimes other than those for which a defen-
dant is being tried is admitted only with caution, as there is the serious danger that
the jury will conclude that defendant has a criminal disposition and thus probably
committed the presently charged offense."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 960 (1988)).
14. Id. at 79, 885 P.2d at 91, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 340. The court noted that the list
of factors was not exhaustive. Id.
15. Id. The danger of prejudice is greater when the two offenses are very similar,
closeness in time between the prior conviction and the current of-
fense,'6 and the "relative seriousness or inflammatory nature of the prior
conviction." 7
Additionally, the court stated that a trial court should consider any
other factors that may mitigate the danger of prejudice. 8 One such fac-
tor that the court acknowledged is the prosecution's use of the prior con-
viction evidence for "purposes other than sentence enhancement." 9 The
court explained that this use discloses the prior conviction evidence to
the jury before the jury determines the defendant's guilt, despite the fact
that the trial is bifurcated. ° The court further stated that the
prosecution may use evidence of a prior conviction to impeach the
defendant's testimony; to prove "the defendant's identity, intent, or plan;"
or to prove an element of the currently charged offense.2 The court
ruled that the presence of these factors may sufficiently mitigate the
danger of prejudice, and negate the need to bifurcate the trial.'
since a jury will more likely conclude that the defendant has a criminal disposition.
See People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 453, 492 P.2d 1, 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 320 (1972)
("A ... difficult problem arises when the prior conviction is for the same or sub-
stantially similar conduct for which the accused is on trial . . . because of the inevi-
table pressure on lay jurors to believe that 'if he did it before he probably did so
this time.'") (quoting Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (App. D.C. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968)).
16. Calderon, 9 Cal. 4th at 79, 885 P.2d at 91, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 340. The danger
of prejudice is greater if the defendant was not recently convicted. See Beagle, 6 Cal.
3d at 453, 492 P.2d at 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 320 ("The nearness or remoteness of the
prior conviction is . . . a factor of no small importance . . . . [I]f [the prior convic-
tion] . . . occurred long before and has been followed by a legally blameless life, [it]
should generally be excluded on the ground of remoteness.").
17. Calderon, 9 Cal. 4th at 79, 885 P.2d at 91, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 340. The danger
of prejudice is greater when the prior conviction involves a serious and inflammatory
offense. See People v. Marquez, 1 Cal. 4th 553, 573, 822 P.2d 418, 428, 3 Cal. Rptr.
2d 710, 720 (1992) (discussing the potential prejudicial effect of "joining . . . an in-
flammatory offense such as child molestation with a murder offense").
18. Calderon, 9 Cal. 4th at 78, 885 P.2d at 90, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 339-40 (overrul-
ing People v. Bracamonte, 119 Cal. App. 3d 644, 654, 174 Cal. Rptr. 191, 198 (1981)
(holding that an alleged repeat offender is always entitled to a bifurcated trial, re-
gardless of the circumstances)).
19. Id. at 78-79, 885 P.2d at 91, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 340 (citing 3 ABA STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 15-3.4 (2d ed. 1980) (stating that a court should prevent disclo-
sure of evidence regarding the defendant's prior convictions "[wihen the defendant's
prior convictions are admissible solely for the purpose of determining the sentence to
be imposed")).
20. Id. at 78, 885 P.2d at 90, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 340.
21. Id. at 78, 885 P.2d at 90, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 339-40 (citing People v. Castro,
38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 111, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985) (allowing impeachment of
defendant with evidence of prior convictions); People v. Valentine, 42 Cal. 3d 170,
173, 720 P.2d 913, 914, 228 Cal. Rptr. 25, 26 (1986) ("[Tlhe jury must be advised that
defendant is an ex-felon where that is an element of a current charge.")).
22. Id. at 79, 885 P.2d at 91, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 340. The court asserted, however,
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Finally, the court granted trial courts the option to conditionally bi-
furcate a trial, subject to future developments during the trial.' The
court suggested that a trial court may retract its ruling to bifurcate and
instead conduct a unitary trial if either the prosecution or the defense
disclose information during the trial that mitigates the danger of preju-
dice.'
Turning to the facts of the instant case, the court held that the trial
court erred when it denied the defendant's motion to bifurcate the trial
without first determining whether a unitary trial would unduly prejudice
the defendant.25 The court found, however, that the trial court's error
did not prejudicially affect the jury's determination of the defendant's
guilt.2" The court reasoned that the defendant did not concede his previ-
ous conviction in front of the jury.27 The court also noted that the pros-
ecution did not use evidence of the prior conviction during the trial to
enhance the sentence of the currently charged offense."
Nevertheless, the court found that the trial court's error might have
prejudiced the jury's determination of the truth of the alleged prior con-
viction.' The court reasoned that the trial court "caused [the] defendant
to forego his right to have a jury determine" the truthfulness of his prior
conviction, when it denied his motion to bifurcate the trial.'
In its disposition of the case, the court affirmed the defendant's sec-
ond degree burglary conviction, but reversed the sentence enhance-
ment."1 The court remanded the sentence enhancement issue and in-
that the interest in avoiding prejudice will often override the interest of convenience
associated with a unitary trial. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
25. Id. at 80, 885 P.2d at 91, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341.
26. Id. The court opined that it would have bifurcated the trial in the first place
because the "defendant recently had been convicted of attempted robbery," and be-
cause the conviction was similar in nature and seriousness to the second-degree bur-
glary charge. Id. at 80, 888 P.2d at 92, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341. Additionally, the court
noted the lack of mitigating circumstances at the time the trial court denied the
defendant's motion to bifurcate. Id. Therefore, there was a substantial risk that the
jury would prejudicially conclude that the defendant committed the burglary since he
had recently attempted robbery. Id. at 80-81, 885 P.2d at 92, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341.
27. Id. at 80, 885 P.2d at 91, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341; see supra note 2.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 80, 885 P.2d at 92, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 81, 885 P.2d at 92, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 342.
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structed the trial court to determine whether its previous refusal to bifur-
cate the trial remained valid in light of the court's present decision.'
B. Justice Mosk's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Mosk agreed with the majority's analysis of the law but dis-
sented to the majority's disposition of the case.' Specifically, Justice
Mosk would remand the case to let the lower courts consider the bur-
glary charge and the resulting four-year state prison sentence, both of
which he considered harsh for a non-violent "attempt, and failure, to take
$29 worth of beer from the refrigerator of a convenience store without
paying the cashier."'
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND IMPACT
The California Legislature enacted Penal Code section 1025 in
1874.' Section 1025 entrusts a jury with two responsibilities whenever a
criminal defendant pleads not guilty and denies an alleged prior convic-
tion.' The jury must determine: (1) whether the defendant is guilty of
the currently charged offense, and; (2) whether the defendant has a prior
conviction.17 Initially, the jury concurrently determined the defendant's
guilt and the truth of the alleged prior conviction.'
In People v. Bracamonte,n however, the California Court of Appeal
held that the jury should always determine the defendant's guilt before it
determines the truth of the alleged prior conviction." The Bracamonte
32. Id. at 81, 885 P.2d at 92-93, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 342. The court instructed the
lower courts to "reinstate the sentence enhancement" if the trial court finds that it
properly refused to bifurcate the determination of guilt and truth. Id. at 81-82, 885
P.2d at 93, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 342. On the other hand, the court instructed the lower
courts to grant the defendant a "limited new trial" on the truthfulness of the alleged
prior conviction if the trial court finds that it should have bifurcated the defendant's
trial. Id. at 82, 885 P.2d at 93, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 342.
33. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
34. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Mosk stated that courts
should reserve the overcrowded state prisons for criminals who commit truly serious
crimes. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
35. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1025 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995).
36. Id.
•37. Id.
38. See People v. Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th 580, 588, 853 P.2d 1093, 1096, 20 Cal. Rptr.
2d 638, 641 (1993) (citing People v. Owens, 112 Cal. App. 3d 441, 169 Cal. Rptr. 359
(1980) (permitting concurrent determination of defendant's guilt and truth of alleged
prior conviction)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1101 (1994).
39. 119 Cal. App. 3d 644, 174 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1981).
40. Id. at 654, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
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court reasoned that evidence of the defendant's prior conviction preju-
dices the jury's determination of the defendant's guilt.4
Disapproving Bracamonte, the California Supreme Court in People
v. Calderon" held that bifurcation of the jury's dual determination is
not always required.' Instead, the court ruled that a trial court should
bifurcate only when a concurrent determination will unduly prejudice the
defendant."
The Calderon decision impacts criminal courts throughout the state.
Whenever the prosecution alleges that a defendant has a prior convic-
tion, the court must carefully examine the unique circumstances of each
case to determine whether a concurrent determination will unduly preju-
dice the defendant.45 The court may not summarily grant or deny a
defendant's motion to bifurcate.
Calderon also impacts the state's criminal defense attorneys. A de-
fense attorney who wishes to bifurcate the jury's dual determination
must convince the court that a concurrent determination of the client's
guilt and the truth of the alleged prior conviction will prejudice the cli-
ent."
As a whole, the Calderon decision safeguards a criminal defendant's
right to a fair trial. Although the prosecution can easily prove a prior
conviction with certified copies of court documents,47 it is the timing of
the presentation of proof that affects the defendant's right to a fair trial.
At the same time, the Calderon decision reduces unnecessary delay in
criminal proceedings. Trial courts will bifurcate the jury's determination
41. Id. at 649-50, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
42. 9 Cal. 4th 69, 885 P.2d 83, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 333 (1994).
43. Id. at 79-80, 885 P.2d at 91, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341.
44. Id. at 72, 885 P.2d at 86, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335.
45. See supra' notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
46. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
47. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 969b (West 1985 & Supp. 1995) ("For the purpose of
establishing ... that a person being tried . . . has been convicted ... the records
or copies of records of any state penitentiary, reformatory, county jail, city jail, or
federal penitentiary .. . certified by the official custodian of such records, may be
introduced as such evidence."). See generally 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3389
(1985 & Supp. 1995) ("A prior conviction may be proved by introduction in evidence
of a certified copy of the judgment of conviction of that offense."); 3 B.E. WrrKIN &
NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment For Crimes § 1528 (2d
ed. 1989 & Supp. 1995) ("The common method of proof of a prior conviction is in-
troduction of the record of conviction, certified by the official custodian."); Michael
G. Oleinik, California Supreme Court Survey, People v. Tenner, 21 PEPP. L. REV.
1051 (1994).
1045
of guilt and truth only when a concurrent determination will unduly prej-
udice the defendant. Indeed, Calderon strikes a healthy balance between
fairness and efficiency in the California criminal justice system.
ROBERT E. SABIDO
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C. A person may be convicted of possession of an ille-
gal drug despite having ingested the drug prior to
arrest if there is substantial evidence of past posses-
sion: People v. Palaschak.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Palaschak,' the California Supreme Court considered
whether a conviction for drug possession could be supported if the drug
was ingested prior to arrest.2 The court held that ingestion of the drug
1. 9 Cal. 4th 1236, 893 P.2d 717, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722 (1995). Chief Justice Lucas
delivered the unanimous opinion of the court, in which Justices Mosk, Kennard, Ara-
bian, Baxter, George, and Werdegar joined. Id. at 1237, 1243, 893 P.2d at 717, 721, 40
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 722, 726.
2. Id. at 1237, 893 P.2d at 717, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 722.
In May of 1991, defendant Douglas Andrew Palaschak, an attorney, informed his
receptionist, Jessica Jobin, that he wanted to try LSD. Id. at 1238, 893 P.2d at 718,
40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 723. On May 7, "defendant loaned his car to Jobin so that she
could obtain some LSD." Id. She bought 50 "hits" or doses of LSD, placed two hits
in a birthday card, and gave the card to Palaschak as a birthday gift the next day.
Id. On May 9, defendant and Jobin ingested some of the LSD at defendant's office.
Id. After his seventeen-year-old secretary observed their unusual behavior, defendant
acknowledged they had taken LSD and "asked her to join them." Id. Jobin then gave
the secretary two hits of LSD. Id. The secretary, however, did not consume the LSD.
Instead, she left and called the police. Id. After the police arrived, defendant admit-
ted taking LSD, and Jobin gave the officers the remaining hits. Id. Both Jobin and
the defendant were subsequently arrested. Id.
Defendant was charged with conspiracy to possess LSD, possession of LSD, and
furnishing or attempting to furnish LSD to a minor. Id. The jury only convicted him
of possession of LSD. Id.; see CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11377 (West 1991 &
Supp. 1995) (providing that the unauthorized possession of a controlled substance is
punishable by imprisonment for up to one year). The jury asked the trial judge dur-
ing its deliberations whether "'possession [has] to be at the time of arrest[.]'"
Palaschak, 9 Cal. 4th at 1239, 893 P.2d at 718, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 723 (alteration in
original). Instead of answering "yes" or "no," the judge reinstructed the jury as to the
elements of possession of a controlled substance. Id.; see CALJIC No. 12.00 (5th ed.
Supp. 1995) (providing the elements of possession are control, knowledge of presence
and nature of substance, and sufficient amount). The trial judge reduced defendant's
conviction to a misdemeanor and probation, with a condition of 90 days imprison-
ment. Palaschak, 9 Cal. 4th at 1239, 893 P.2d at 718, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 723. The
court of appeal reversed the conviction, stating that the possession charge was un-
supported by substantial evidence, since, at the time of the arrest, defendant no lon-
ger had "dominion and control" over the drug. Id. at 1239, 893 P.2d at 718-19, 40
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 723-24. The California Supreme Court granted review and reversed
the judgment of the court of appeal. Id. at 1243, 893 P.2d at 721, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
726.
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prior to arrest can sustain a possession charge as long as there is sub-
stantial evidence, either direct or circumstantial, of past possession.'
Therefore, the supreme court, in a unanimous decision, reversed the
judgment of the court of appeal and reinstated the conviction.4
II. TREATMENT
Chief Justice Lucas began the opinion by addressing the arguments
of the court of appeal.' The Chief Justice first acknowledged that the
use or ingestion of LSD has not been criminalized.6 The court also recog-
nized that "evidence of useless traces or residue of narcotic substances
do not constitute sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for posses-
sion of narcotics."7 The Chief Justice did not agree, however, with the
court of appeal's conclusion that evidence of past possession was insuf-
ficient to sustain a drug possession charge in this case.8
The court agreed with the court of appeal's dissenting opinion
which argued that there was more than enough evidence to sustain the
defendant's conviction.9 The court asserted that a possession charge
should not be defeated if the evidence is lost or destroyed by inges-
tion.'" Although the court declined to rule on whether evidence of drug
ingestion alone could sustain a possession charge," it held that direct or
3. Palaschak, 9 Cal. 4th at 124041, 893 P.2d at 719-20, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 724-25.
4. Id. at 1243, 893 P.2d at 721, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 726.
5. Id. at 1239-40, 893 P.2d at 718-19, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 723-24.
6. Id. at 1239, 893 P.2d at 718, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 723; see People v. Spann, 187
Cal. App. 3d 400, 232 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1986) (discussing drug possession and use laws
in California).
7. Palaschak, 9 Cal. 4th at 1240, 893 P.2d at 719, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 724 (quoting
People v. Fein, 4 Cal. 3d 747, 754, 484 P.2d 583, 588, 94 Cal. Rptr. 607, 612 (1971));
see People v. Leal, 64 Cal. 2d 504, 413 P.2d 665, 50 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1966) (holding
that paraphernalia "bearing useless traces or residue of narcotics" is insufficient to
sustain possession charge); People v. Sullivan, 234 Cal. App. 2d 562, 44 Cal. Rptr. 524
(1965) (same); see also 18 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 1542 (1984 & Supp. 1995)
(discussing the quantities necessary to sustain a possession charge).
8. Palaschak, 9 Cal. 4th at 1240, 893 P.2d at 719, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 724.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1241, 893 P.2d at 720, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725; see People v. Stump, 14
Cal. App. 3d 440, 92 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1971) (possession charge established despite the
fact that defendant swallowed balloon containing drug); People v. Smith, 184 Cal.
App. 2d 606, 7 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1960) (possession conviction sustained despite defen-
dant's attempt to ingest the evidence prior to arrest). See generally Lawrence B.
Solum & Stephen J. Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction
of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085 (1987) (analyzing the legal controls on evidence
destruction); 2 B.E. WITEIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes
Against Public Peace and Wefare § 1003 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the
effect of evidence destruction on possession charges).
11. Palaschak, 9 Cal. 4th at 1240-41, 893 P.2d at 719, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 724. The
court, in prior cases, has held that mere evidence of use or being under the influ-
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circumstantial evidence of past possession was sufficient to convict for
that offense.12 The court reasoned that, because proof of possession at
the time of arrest is not required, 3 satisfactory evidence of past posses-
sion beyond evidence of ingestion will support a possession charge. 4
The court concluded by noting that the present case had each ele-
ment needed to establish drug possession." The essential elements are
"dominion and control of the substance in a quantity usable for con-
sumption... with knowledge of its presence and of its restricted dan-
gerous drug character."" The record showed that defendant requested
and obtained LSD, and he admitted ingesting one and one-half doses. 7
The court declared that the evidence established defendant's possession
of the illegal drug and sustained his conviction despite the fact that he
ingested the drug prior to arrest.8
III. IMPACT
Prior to the court's decision in Palaschak, the supreme court had
held that one element necessary to sustain a conviction for possession of
ence of an illegal drug does not circumstantially prove possession. See People v.
Spann, 187 Cal. App. 3d 400, 403, 232 Cal. Rptr. 31, 32 (1986) (stating that after con-
sumption the user no longer has dominion and control over the drug and therefore
does not possess it); see also Thomas R. Ascik, For the Criminal Practitioner, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 375, 407 (1995) (distinguishing between use and possession); 28
C.J.S. Drugs & Narcotics Supp. § 157 (1974 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the effect of
ingestion on dominion and control); 2 B.E. WrrIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA
CRiMiNAL LAW, Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare § 1003 (discussing what
constitutes illegal possession).
The court added that ingestion "at best only raises an inference of prior posses-
sion." Palaschak, 9 Cal. 4th at 1241, 893 P.2d at 719, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 724.
12. Palaschak, 9 Cal. 4th at 1242, 893 P.2d at 720, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725.
13. Id. (citing People v. Sullivan, 234 Cal. App. 2d 562, 567, 44 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529
(1965)); see 18 CAL. JUR. 3D § 1547 (1984 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the elements of
possession).
14. Palaschak, 9 Cal. 4th at 1242-43, 893 P.2d at 720-21, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725-26.
15. Id. at 1242, 893 P.2d at 720, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725.
16. Id. (quoting People v. Camp, 104 Cal. App. 3d 244, 247-48, 163 Cal. Rptr. 510,
512, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 960 (1980)).
17. Palaschak, 9 Cal. 4th at 1242, 893 P.2d at 720-21, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725-26.
Defendant's secretary testified that, at defendant's request, she gave him two hits
of LSD. Id. at 1242, 893 P.2d at 720, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725. Defendant admitted to
police and to the media that he ingested the drug. Id. at 1242, 893 P.2d at 721, 40
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 726. He told reporters that he had taken the drug "in order to create
a 'better social environment' in his office." Ventura Lawyer Loses Drug Charge Ap-
peal, DAILY NEWS L.A., May 10, 1995, at T02.
18. Palaschak, 9 Cal. 4th at 1242-43, 893 P.2d at 721, 40 Cal. Rptr 2d at 726.
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a controlled substance is the defendant's possession, either physical or
constructive, of the drug." A defendant possesses a drug when it is un-
der his or her dominion and control." Before Palaschak, the court of
appeal held that once a defendant ingested a drug there was no longer
dominion and control.2' Therefore, it was thought that possession ended
once ingestion occurred.
The court's decision in Palaschak modified the law. The court held
that as long as there is some additional evidence of past possession,
ingestion of the drug will not defeat a possession charge.22 The effect of
this holding is that although the use of LSD alone is not illegal, use or in-
gestion plus sufficient evidence of past possession can sustain a posses-
sion charge.' The question that remains unanswered is how much addi-
tional evidence of past possession is needed. The court previously held
that such evidence can be direct or circumstantial,24 but the definition
of sufficient is still an issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Palaschak, the California Supreme Court held that a person may
be convicted of possessing an illegal drug despite having ingested the
drug prior to arrest. 5 As a result of this case, a drug possession charge
can be based on sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence of past pos-
session, regardless of whether the defendant has already consumed or
19. See 2 B.E. WrrIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW Crimes
Against Public Peach and Welfare §§ 1001, 1003, 1004. See generally Michael S. Deal,
United States v. Walker: Constructive Possession of Controlled Substances: Pushing
the Limits of Exclusive Control, 2 J. PHARMAcY & L. 401 (1994) (discussing the con-
structive possession doctrine); Charles H. Whitebread & Ronald Stevens, Constructive
Possession in Narcotics Cases: To Have and Have Not, 58 VA. L. REV. 751 (1972)
(same); George H. Singer, Note, Constructive Possession of Controlled Substances: A
North Dakota Look at a Nationwide Problem, 68 N.D. L. REV. 981 (1992) (same).
20. See People v. Camp, 104 Cal. App. 3d 244, 163 Cal. Rptr. 510, cert. denied, 449
U.S. 960 (1980); 18 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 1547 (1984 & Supp. 1995). See
generally 28 C.J.S., Drugs & Narcotics Supp. § 155 (1974 & Supp. 1995) (discussing
elements of possession).
21. See People v. Stump, 14 Cal. App. 3d 440, 92 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1971); People v.
Smith, 184 Cal. App. 2d 606, 7 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1960); 2 B.E. WITK N & NORMAN L.
EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare § 1003
(2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995); Solum & Marzen, supra note 10, at 1085.
22. People v. Pataschak, 9 Cal. 4th 1236, 1242-43, 893 P.2d 717, 721, 40 Cal. Rptr.
2d 722, 726 (1995).
23. Id. at 1240-41, 893 P.2d at 719, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 724.
24. Id. at 1241, 893 P.2d at 720, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725; see 18 CAL. JUR. 3D
Criminal Law § 1567 (1984 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the weight of evidence for
possession of drugs).
25. Palaschak, 9 Cal. 4th at 1242, 893 P.2d at 721, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 726.
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ingested the drug.26 It seems unlikely that evidence of ingestion alone
will sustain a possession charge because the court stated that ingestion
"at best raises only an inference of prior possession."27 The court's rul-
ing in this case, however, slightly blurs the distinction between the "use"
and "possession" of a drug.
WENDY M. HUNTER
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26. Id. at 1242-43, 893 P.2d at 721, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 726.
27. Id. at 1240-41, 893 P.2d at 719, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 724.
D. Under California Penal Code section 208(d), kid-
napping with intent to commit rape is a separate
offense, not an enhancement to simple kidnapping,
and movement of a victim at night from a parking
lot to an area 105 feet away behind a wall was suf-
ficient evidence of asportation to support a kidnap-
ping conviction: People v. Rayford.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Rayford,1 the California Supreme Court considered two
issues. The first issue was whether California Penal Code section 208(d),
which proscribes kidnapping "with the intent to commit rape, oral copu-
lation, sodomy, or rape by instrument,"2 is a separate offense rather than
merely an enhancement to simple kidnapping.3 The second issue was
under what circumstances would evidence of asportation be sufficient to
support a conviction under Penal Code section 208(d).4 The court held
that kidnapping with the intent to commit rape is a separate crime and
that the evidence of asportation, in this case, was sufficient to support
the kidnapping conviction under section 208(d).5
1. 9 Cal. 4th 1, 884 P.2d 1369, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 317 (1994). Justice Arabian wrote
the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Kennard, Baxter,
George, and Werdegar joined. Id. at 1-23, 884 P.2d at 1369-82, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
317-31. Justice Mosk filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 24-26, 884 P.2d at 1382-84, 36
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 331-33 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 208(d) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
3. Rayford, 9 Cal. 4th at 5, 884 P.2d at 1370, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 319.
4. Id. In the present case, the defendant approached the victim as the victim
entered the parking lot of a closed store at night. Id. at 5-6, 884 P.2d at 1370, 36
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 319. The defendant told her he had a gun and ordered her to walk
with him. Id. at 6, 884 P.2d at 1370, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 319. He took the victim
behind a wall at the end of the parking lot, approximately 34 feet from the street.
Id. The defendant told the victim to remove her clothes, which she did. Id. The
victim was able to dissuade defendant from raping her because she was menstruat-
ing. Id. It was later determined that the defendant had moved the victim a distance
of approximately 105 feet. Id.
5. Id. at 5, 884 P.2d at 1370, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 319. The defendant was found
guilty of the kidnapping charges and sentenced to 17 years in prison. Id. at 7, 884
P.2d at 1371, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 320. The court of appeal tentatively concluded that
§ 208(d) was an enhancement to simple kidnapping under § 207(a), but that defen-
dant had "waived his right to challenge the form of the pleading by failing to file a
demurrer." Id. The court of appeal went on to conclude that the standard to deter-
mine the sufficiency of asportation under § 208(d) was the same as that under § 207
simple kidnapping. Id. Applying that standard, the court of appeal found the asporta-
tion evidence insufficient and reversed the kidnapping conviction, remanding the case
for resentencing. Id.
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II. TREATMENT
A. The Majority Opinion
The court first considered the question of whether section 208(d)
sets forth a separate crime or is an enhancement to simple kidnapping
under section 207.6 The court noted that if it determined section 208(d)
provided merely an enhancement to section 207(a) simple kidnapping,
then the asportation test for section 207(a) would necessarily be part of
section 208(d), and it would not have to address the issue of asporta-
tion.7 Both parties submitted that section 208(d) set forth a separate
crime and the California Supreme Court agreed.8 The court gave two
reasons for its conclusion. First, the legislature referred to section 208(d)
as a separate offense in section 667.61. Second, the court looked to its
own approach to determine whether a statute is an enhancement or a
separate crime. In People v. Hernandez,' the court contrasted an en-
hancement, "'an additional term of imprisonment added to the base
term,'"" with a separate offense, whose base term "involve[s] ... a
choice among three possible terms prescribed by statute." 2 The
Rayford court noted that the legislature modified the way in which it
drafts enhancements since People v. Hernandez, but concluded that the
legislative history accompanying the passage of section 208(d) supported
6. Id. at 8, 884 P.2d at 1371, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 320. California Penal Code
§ 207(a) provides in relevant part, "Every person who forcibly, or by any other
means of instilling fear, steals or takes, or holds, detains, or arrests any. person in
this state, and carries the person ... into another part of the same county, is guilty
of kidnapping." CAL PENAL CODE § 207(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995). See 1 B.E.
WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes Against the Person
§ 532 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the nature of the crime of simple kid-
napping); 17 CAL JuR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 459-463 (1984 & Supp. 1995) (simple
kidnapping). California Penal Code § 208(d) states: "If the person is kidnapped with
the intent to commit rape, oral copulation, sodomy, or rape by instrument, the kid-
napping is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 5, 8, or 11 years. CAL
PENAL CODE § 208(d) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995). See 17 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law
§§ 464-476 (1984 & Supp. 1994) (aggravated kidnapping). See generally 1 B.E. WrrKIN
& NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes Against the Person §§ 532-
553 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the nature of the crime and elements of
the offense of simple and aggravated kidnapping).
7. Rayford, 9 Cal. 4th at 8, 884 P.2d at 1372, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 320.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 8, 884 P.2d at 1372, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 321.
10. 46 Cal. 3d 194, 757 P.2d 1013, 249 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1988).
11. Id. at 207, 757 P.2d at 1020, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 857 (quoting CAL. CT. R. 405(c)).
12. Id.
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its finding that section 208(d) sets forth a separate crime and not merely
an enhancement. 3
The court next addressed the issue of asportation. In particular, the
court discussed the standard for sufficient evidence of asportation."
The court noted that there were two different asportation standards, one
for aggravated kidnapping under section 209(b) and one for simple kid-
napping under section 207(a)."5 The Daniels standard for aggravated
kidnapping has two elements: (1) movement of the victim that is not
merely incidental to the associated robbery, and (2) movement that sub-
stantially increases the risk of harm over that which is already present in
the robbery.'6 The standard for simple kidnapping focuses on the move-
ment of the victim, requiring the movement to be "substantial in charac-
ter."'7 The court concluded that the proper standard for section 208(d)
kidnapping is the Daniels standard used for aggravated kidnapping.'8
In reaching its conclusion, the court examined the language of both
section 208(d) and section 209(b). Noting the similarity between the two
sections, the court reasoned that "the Legislature undoubtedly intended
to incorporate a similar asportation requirement [to section 209(b)] into
section 208(d)."9 The court further reasoned that the Daniels standard
should apply to section 208(d) because, unlike simple kidnapping, one
cannot commit section 208(d) kidnapping in the absence of the "associat-
ed crimes or attempted crimes of 'rape, oral copulation, sodomy, or rape
by instrument.'"2" Thus, since section 208(d) "proscribe[s] kidnapping
for the purpose of conunitting a particular offense," the court noted that
the second prong of the Daniels standard, which focuses on the in-
creased danger to the victim caused by the movement, beyond the dan-
ger inherent in the underlying crime, is the proper standard for section
208(d).2'
13. Rafford, 9 Cal. 4th at 9-11, 884 P.2d at 1373-74, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 322-23.
14. Id. at 11, 884 P.2d at 1374, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 323.
15. Id. at 11-12, 884 P.2d at 1374, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 323.
16. Id. at 12, 884 P.2d at 1374, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 323. (citing People v. Daniels,
71 Cal. 2d 1119, 1139, 459 P.2d 225, 238, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897, 910 (1969)). The court
discussed both prongs of the Daniels standard, stating that the first prong is deter-
mined by looking at the "scope and nature" of the movement and the second prong
is determined by "considering the context of the environment in which the movement
occurred." Id.
17. Id. at 14, 884 P.2d at 1375, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 325; see supra note 14 and ac-
companying text The standard for simple kidnapping has not been clearly defined
and the court noted that it has offered little guidance as to what the term "substan-
tial in character" means. Id.
18. Id. at 14, 884 P.2d at 1376, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 325.
19. Id. at 21, 884 P.2d at 1380, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 329.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 21, 884 P.2d at 1381, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 329-30.
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Using the Daniels standard, the court reversed the decision of the
court of appeals and agreed with the jury's findings that the evidence in
the present case was sufficient to support the kidnapping conviction.'
B. Justice Mosk's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Mosk agreed with the majority opinion that the Daniels stan-
dard is the proper standard for section 208(d) kidnapping, but he found
that the evidence of asportation insufficient to support the verdict.'
Justice Mosk felt that the movement of the victim did not substantially
increase the risk of harm to her.24 In his dissent, Justice Mosk pointed
out that the area to which the victim was moved was lighted with about
the same intensity as the primary location and the defendant and victim
remained visible from the street at all times.25 Based upon the record
and his view that the secondary location did not aid concealment of the
attempted rape, Justice Mosk concluded that "no reasonable trier of fact
could have found the asportation of... [the victim] 'substantially in-
creased her risk of harm.' 26
III. IMPACT
In Rayford, the California Supreme Court decided that the Daniels
test was the proper standard of asportation for section 208(d) kidnapping
for rape.27 The court may have resolved the immediate issue, however,
its continued use of asportation as the defining element does not elimi-
nate the problem. The problem, which the present case illustrates, is that
there are no guidelines for the application of the test and a defendant
may be subjected to the harsh penalties of aggravated kidnapping for
minimal movement. While the court may have eliminated the confusion
that existed amongst the lower courts concerning which test applied to
section 208(d), it did not provide the courts with guidelines to eliminate
the confusion surrounding its application, i.e., when is the movement not
merely incidental and when has that movement substantially increased
the risk of harm. Justice Mosk's dissent illustrates how, even though this
22. Id. at 23, 884 P.2d at 1382, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at; 331.
23. Id. at 24, 884 P.2d at 1383, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332 (Mosk, J. dissenting).
24. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 25, 884 P.2d at 1383-84, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332 (Mosk, J. dissenting).
26. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 20-21, 884 P.2d at 1380, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 329.
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test may work in theory, in fact minimal evidence of asportation can
result in a conviction of aggravated kidnappingY
Like Justice Mosk, I do not disagree with the court's finding that the
Daniels test is the proper standard of asportation for section 208(d)
kidnapping, however, I feel that the court needs to provide some guide-
lines regarding its application to help ensure that the test works in fact,
as well as in theory.'
IV. CONCLUSION
In reaching its decision in People v. Rayford, the court extended the
Daniels test to section 208(d) kidnapping for rape.3 This decision is
contrary to the court's previous decisions in which it "declined to extend
the Daniels test to either simple kidnapping or a kidnapping involving an
associated crime other than robbery."3' Considering the Daniels test's
suitability to types of kidnapping, which by definition proscribe kidnap-
ping for the purpose of committing another offense, it is likely that the
court will extend this test to kidnapping involving other associated
crimes.
NICOLE CALABRO
28. Id. at 25, 884 P.2d at 1383, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332. "In fact there was no sub-
stantial increase in isolation . . . . Nor was there a significant increase in seclusion
attributable to the presence of physical barriers to observation by third parties at the
secondary location." Id.
29. Cf. John L. Diamond, Kidnapping: A Modern Definition, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1
(1985) (discussing the problems with California's current definition of kidnapping and
suggesting an alternative).
30. Id. at 20-21, 884 P.2d at 1380, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 329.
31. Id. at 21, 884 P.2d at 1380-81, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 329.
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E. A trial court's failure to give jury instructions on
elements of sentence enhancement for use of a dead-
ly or dangerous weapon under California Penal
Code section 12022(b) warrants a reversal only
where it is reasonably probable that without the
error, the jury would have decided more favorably
for the defendant: People v. Wims.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Wims,' the California Supreme Court determined the
standard of review for a trial court's failure to specifically instruct the
jury as to the factual elements of a sentence enhancement for the use of
a deadly or dangerous weapon as prescribed by California Penal Code
section 12022(b).2 Reversing the appellate court's decision, the supreme
court determined that such a failure mandates reversal only "where it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would
have been reached in the absence of the error."3 Unable to find the prob-
1. 10 Cal. 4th 293, 895 P.2d 77, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 241 (1995). Justice Werdegar
authored the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Arabian,
Baxter and George co'ncurred. Id. at 298-316, 895 P.2d 78-90, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 242-
54. Justice Mosk filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. Id. at 316-17, 895 P.2d 90-
91, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 254-55 (Mask, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Kennard
also filed a separate concurring and dissenting opinion. Id. at 317-29, 895 P.2d 91-98,
41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255-62 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
2. CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE § 12022(b) provides:
Any person who personally uses a deadly or dangerous weapon in the com-
mission or attempted commission of a felony shall, upon conviction of that
felony or attempted felony, in addition and consecutive to the punishment
prescribed for the felony or attempted felony of which he or she has been
convicted, be punished by an additional term of one year, unless use of a
deadly or dangerous weapon is an element of the offense of which he or she
was convicted.
CAL PENAL CODE § 12022(b) (West Supp. 1995). See generally 3 B. E. WITIN & NOR-
MAN L EPSrEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment for Crime § 1489 (2d ed. 1989
& Supp. 1995) (explaining sentence enhancements for weapon use); 18 CAL. JUR. 3D
Criminal Law § 1630 (1984) (discussing CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE § 12022(b)). For a
general discussion of sentence enhancements, see 18 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law
§ 3410 (1984); Cynthia R. Cook, The Armed Career Criminal Act Amendment: A Fed-
eral Sentence Enhancement Provision, 12 GEO. MASON U. L REV. 99, 106-08 (1989);
Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of De-
terminate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L REV. 61 (1993).
3. Wims, 10 Cal. 4th at 298, 895 P.2d at 79, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 242-43 (citing
People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243, 255 (1956), cert. denied, 355
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ability of a more favorable result had the trial judge instructed the jury
of the specific elements of the enhancement, the court reinstated the
defendants' sentence enhancements pursuant to section 12022(b).4
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
1. Did the Trial Court Err?
Justice Werdegar began with a discussion of the trial court's jury in-
struction duties to determine if error occurred in this case.' The court
explained that criminal cases require a full jury instruction on the law
affecting the case and found that the trial court judge failed to satisfy
that requirement in the instant case.6 Justice Werdegar acknowledged
the wealth of cases supporting a defendant's right to appropriate jury in-
structions on "weapon use enhancement allegation[s]," 7 and found that
by not instructing the jury as to the elements of the enhancement, the
trial court in this case "[pIlainly" erred.8
2. Did the Error Violate Defendants' Constitutional Rights?
The court first addressed whether the trial court's error affected the
defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial, finding "'no Sixth
Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns on
specific findings of fact.'"9 Justice Werdegar considered the defendants'
argument that the Sixth Amendment applied because section 12022(b)
U.S. 846 (1957)).
4. Id. at 316, 895 P.2d at 90, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 254. This appeal arose from a
jury's finding that defendants, Wilbert Ford and Clifton Wims, 'were guilty of second
degree robbery while using a knife deadly weapons. Id. at 302, 895 P.2d at 81, 41
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 245. The jury, without instructions as to the factual elements neces-
sary to support application of the sentence enhancement under section 12022(b), and
having heard only a reading of the verdict form regarding a section 12022(b) en-
hancement, found the enhancement applicable to both defendants. Id. at 301-02, 895
P.2d at 80-81, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 244-45. The defendants appealed. Id. at 302, 895
P.2d at 81, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 245. The court of appeal found for the defendants and
reversed the sentence enhancements. Id. The People appealed and their petition for
review was granted. Id.
5. Id. at 303, 895 P.2d at 81, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 245.
6. Id. at 303, 895 P.2d at 81-82, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 245-46.
7. Id. at 303, 895 P.2d at 82, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 304, 895 P.2d at 82, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246 (quoting McMillan v. Penn-
sylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) (citing Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984))).
Justice Werdegar explained that the right to a jury trial on sentence enhancements
stems from state, not federal, law and "is conditional on the underlying offense being
tried to a jury." Id.
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enhancement looks like a separate crime, even though it is labeled an en-
hancement.'" Although Justice Werdegar conceded that such similarities
may exist," she found that case law 2 and legislative intent 3 support-
10. Id. For a discussion of the distinction between offense and sentence enhance-
ment, see Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1179 (1993).
11. Wim.s, 10 Cal. 4th at 304, 895 P.2d at 82, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246.
12. Id. Justice Werdegar examined California and United States Supreme Court
cases divining the nature of sentence enhancement allegations. Id. at 304-09, 895 P.2d
at 82-85, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 245-49. The court noted the history of California deci-
sions that found enhancements not to be separate offenses. Id. at 304-05, 895 P.2d at
82-83, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 245-46 (citing People v. Bouzas, 53 Cal. 3d 467, 807 P.2d
1076, 279 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1991); People v. Turner, 145 Cal. App. 3d 658, 193 Cal.
Rptr. 614 (1983); People v. Waite, 146 Cal. App. 3d 585, 194 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1983)).
Justice Werdegar also noted California decisions which specifically found that section
12022(b) is simply an additional penalty proviso, not a separate offense. Id. at 305,
895 P.2d at 83, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247 (citing People v. Hernandez, 46 Cal. 3d 194,
757 P.2d 1013, 249 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1988); People v. Wolcott, 34 Cal. 3d 92, 748 P.2d
520, 192 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1983); People v. Smith, 163 Cal. App. 3d 908, 210 Cal. Rptr.
43 (1985)). See also 3 B.E. WITIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CAUFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW,
Punishment for Crime § 1473 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1995) (discussing nature of sen-
tence enhancements); 18 CAL. JUR. 3D, Criminal Law § 1629 (1984) ("The added
punishment provisions do not create a separate offense").
Justice Werdegar also examined the United States Supreme Court's decision in
McMillan which concluded that Pennsylvania's choice to define the exact impact that
the use of a deadly weapon will have on sentencing for a felony did not "'transform[
I against its will a sentencing factor into an element of some hypothetical offense.'"
Wims, 10 Cal. 4th at 306, 895 P.2d at 83-84, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247-48 (quoting
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89-90) (internal quotations omitted).
13. Id. at 306, 895 P.2d at 84, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 248. "The [California]
Legislature's decision to impose an additional prison term for personal use of a dead-
ly or dangerous weapon . . . does not transform section 12022(b) from a sentencing
provision into a substantive offense." Id. Justice Werdegar attacked Justice Kennard's
conclusion that a sentence enhancement is "'the functional equivalent of a criminal
offense.'" Id. at 306-07, 895 P.2d at 84, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 248 (quoting Wims, 10
Cal. 4th at 318, 895 P.2d at 91, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255) (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting)). Justice Werdegar asserted that if the legislature had wanted to create a
new offense, it would have, and pointed to California Penal Code §§ 666 and 12021
as examples. Id. at 306-07, 895 P.2d at 84, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 248. Further, because
the legislature
created a conditional right to a jury trial in section 12022(b), it realized that "such a
right was not constitutionally compelled and that the enhancement was not intended
to be . . . equivalent to a substantive offense." Id. at 307 n.7, 895 P.2d at 84 n.7, 41
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 248 n.7; see also Jill Rafaloff, The Armed Career Criminal Act: Sen-
tence Enhancement Statute or New Offense?, 56 FORDHAM L REV. 1085 (1988) (dis-
cussing legislative intent analysis in the interpretation of sentence enhancement stat-
utes).
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ed the fact that sentence enhancements are not akin to separate crimes
and therefore, they do not implicate a defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights. 14
then explored the factors employed by the McMillan Court to find
that a similar Pennsylvania sentencing allegation was constitutional: 5
(1) the court must defer to the state legislature's criminal justice deci-
sions;" (2) whether the enhancement provision disposes of "'the pre-
sumption of innocence"' or removes the prosecution's burden of proof;7
(3) whether the legislature redefined an existing crime exclusively to
evade due process standards;' and (4) whether the enhancement stat-
ute was "based upon a 'factor'" traditionally weighed by sentencing
courts when assessing punishment.9 The McMillan factors were used
by the Ninth Circuit in Nichols v. McCormick" to find a sentencing en-
hancement for use of a weapon during the offense constitutional because
"a state is free to define possession of a weapon as a sentencing fac-
tor"2' without invoking a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.' Find-
ing the Nichols weapons enhancement statute similar to section
12022(b), the court agreed with the Ninth Circuit and rejected
defendants' argument that the enhancement triggered their Sixth
Amendment rights.'
Next, Justice Werdegar evaluated defendants' argument that the trial
court's omission deprived them of their due process and equal protection
rights.24 Although defendants cited numerous cases which they believe
supported their contention, the court found none controlling in this
case.
25
14. Wims, 10 Cal. 4th at 307, 895 P.2d at 84, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 248. A sentence
enhancement is not the same as a separate offense, primarily because a defendant
cannot be punished pursuant to an enhancement provision until found guilty "of a
related substantive offense." Id. Once convicted, "a defendant's liberty interest 'has
been substantially diminished by a guilty verdict.'" Id. (quoting McMiUlan, 477 U.S. at
84).
15. Id. at 307, 895 P.2d at 85, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 249.
16. Id. at 308, 895 P.2d at 85, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 249 (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at
85-86).
17. Id. (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87).
18. Id. (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89).
19. Id. (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89). The instrumentality used in the commis-
sion of the crime would be such a factor. Id.
20. 929 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1115 (1992).
21. Wims, 10 Cal. 4th at 308, 895 P.2d at 85, 41 Cal. Rptr 2d at 249 (quoting
Nichols, 929 F.2d at 511).
22. Id. at 309, 895 P.2d at 85, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 249.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 309-14, 895 P.2d at 85-89, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 249-53.
25. Id.
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Defendants first alleged that they were denied "state-mandated jury
discretion"16 in violation of Hicks v. Oklahoma.27 The court disagreed,
finding that section 12022(b) does not grant defendants the same jury
sentencing discretion prescribed by Hicks" and that "Hicks does not
invalidate every true finding rendered on a sentencing provision" where
the trial court misinstructs the jury.2" Also, because the defendants did
not suffer the level of deprivation considered by the Hicks decision, the
Hicks rationale did not apply to this case."
Secondly, defendants argued that under People v. Hernandez,3 a
trial court's failure to provide complete jury instructions makes the trial
"fundamentally unfair."32 The court rejected defendants' argument be-
cause Hernandez did not stand for that principle.' The court then
26. Id. at 309, 895 P.2d at 86, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
27. 447 U.S. 343 (1980). In Hicks, the defendant was convicted of drug distribution.
Id. at 345. In sentencing the defendant, the jury applied an Oklahoma statute mandat-
ing a 40-year prison term for a habitual drug offender, which was found unconsti-
tutional shortly after the defendant's conviction. Id. at 344-45. The Supreme Court
remarked that a defendant's liberty can only be removed "by the jury in the exercise
of its statutory discretion," and not by "arbitrary" state action. Id. at 346. Since the
jury had not made its own sentencing decision, the Court found that the defendant
had been denied due process. Id. at 347.
28. Wims, 10 Cal. 4th at 310, 895 P.2d at 86, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 250. "[Alt most
they were entitled to a jury finding on whether the section 12022(b) enhancement
allegation was true."
Id. at 309-10, 895 P.2d at 86, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 250. The jury made that determina-
tion. Id. at 310, 895 P.2d at 86, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 250.
29. Id. (citing Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 741 (1990), which found that
the United States Constitution did not preclude an appellate court from affirming a
jury's sentencing based on a partially incorrect aggravating circumstances instruction).
The court found that Clemons, rather than Hicks, applied, and following the Clemons
holding, determined that in cases of jury misdirection, California appellate review
adequately protects a defendant's due process rights as contemplated by Hicks. Id. at
310-11, 895 P.2d at 86-87, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 250-51.
30. Id. at 309-310, 895 P.2d at 86, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 250; see People v. Odle, 45
Cal. 3d 386, 754 P.2d 184, 247 Cal. Rptr. 137 (refusing to extend the Hicks rationale
to special circumstances jury misinstruction), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 917 (1988).
31. 46 Cal. 3d 194, 757 P.2d 1013, 249 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1988).
32. Wims, 10 Cal. 4th at 311, 895 P.2d at 87, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 251. Hernandez
involved an additional three year sentence which was never mentioned at trial.
Hernandez, 46 Cal. 3d at 199, 757 P.2d at 1015, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 852. The enhance-
ment was first mentioned in the probation report after the conviction. Id.
33. Wims, 10 Cal. 4th at 311-12, 895 P.2d at 87, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 251. Justice
Werdegar explained that the Hernandez discussion on lack of jury instruction was
merely dictum because the focus of the Hernandez holding was the failure to pro-
vide notice to the defendant of the possibility of an increased sentence and by failing
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looked at defendants' contention that the misinstruction created "struc-
tural defects" in the trial, constitutionally resulting in a per se reversible
error under People v. Cummings.' The court again disagreed, finding
Cummings inapplicable because it involved mnisinstruction about the
elements of a substantive crime, not a sentencing allegation.'
Next, the court considered defendants' argument that under Morgan
v. Ilinois,' the court must apply the federal standard for a violation of
the federal jury trial right to a state violation of the state jury trial
right." Yet again, the court dismissed defendants' argument finding that
Morgan did not apply because Morgan merely supported the principle
that federal due process would not allow predetermined pro-death sen-
tence jurors to vote on capital sentencing.' Defendants' case did not in-
volve this issue.'
Finally, Justice Werdegar reviewed defendants' argument that defen-
dants facing liberty loss from sentence enhancements are in the same
position as those losing liberty from a separate offense, and therefore,
sentencing enhancement requires complete jury instructions the same as
those required for the underlying offense.4" The court found that, "[a]s a
matter of federal constitutional law," this position is incorrect because a
convicted defendant "has a substantially diminished liberty interest at
risk in connection with any related sentencing determination."4
to do so, the court relieved the prosecution of their burden to plead and prove all of
the elements. Id.
34. 4 Cal. 4th 1233, 850 P.2d 1, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1576 (1994).
35. Wires, 10 Cal. 4th at 312 n.8, 895 P.2d at 88 n.8, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 252 n.8.
Justice Werdegar reiterated the principle that a defendant has no constitutional right
to a jury trial on a sentencing factor. Id.; see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
The court also considered other possible factors for per se reversible error, conclud-
ing that defendants received adequate representation of counsel and that "[t]here was
no 'misdescription of the burden of proof, which vitiates all the jury's findings.'"
Wits, 10 Cal. 4th at 313, 895 P.2d at 88, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 252 (quoting Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2082 (1993)).
36. 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
37. Wims, 10 Cal. 4th at 313, 895 P.2d at 88, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 252.
38. Id. (citing Morgan, 504 U.S. at 722-733).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 313-14, 895 P.2d at 88-89, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 252-53.
41. Id. at 314, 895 P.2d at 89, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 253. Therefore, states are not
compelled "to treat enhancement determinations exactly like determinations on sub-
stantive offenses." Id.
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3. Did the Error Prejudice the Defendants?
Lastly, the court considered whether the trial court's error was prej-
udicial, thus mandating reversal.42 Justice Werdegar first established the
standard for review by consolidating the California Constitution provi-
sion, classifying jury misdirection as reversible error only if, after com-
plete examination, the court finds the error "'resulted in a miscarriage of
justice,'"' with the harmlessness test presented in People v. Watson';
this created an amalgam that prescribes reversal where there is misdirec-
tion of the jury, in the absence of which, the jury would have probably
reached a result "more favorable to the defendant."45 Applying this stan-
dard and fully considering the trial court record, the court found no prej-
udice to the defendants.46
B. Justice Mosk's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Mosk wrote a brief, individual opinion supporting the ulti-
mate judgment, but disagreeing with the majority's finding of no preju-
dice.47 He did not, however, agree with Justice Kennard's view with re-
spect to defendant Ford that the error was harmless, as he considered
the error prejudicial as to both defendants.'
C. Justice Kennard's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennard wrote separately to expound upon her belief that
sentence enhancements are "the functional equivalent" of substantive
criminal offenses and should, therefore, be afforded the same rights.49
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 13).
44. 46 Cal. 2d 818, 299 P.2d 243 (1956).
45. Wims, 10 Cal. 4th at 315, 895 P.2d at 89, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 253.
46. Id. at 315-16, 895 P.2d at 90, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 254. Justice Werdegar ex-
plained that the evidence pointing to defendants' personal knife use was so compel-
ling that further enhancement instructions were not likely to lead the jury to a differ-
ent conclusion. Id.
47. Id. at 316-17, 895 P.2d at 90-91, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 254-55 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting); see infra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
48. Wims, 10 Cal. 4th at 317, 895 P.2d at 91, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting); see infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
49. Wims, 10 Cal. 4th at 318, 895 P.2d at 91, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255 (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting). For a similar viewpoint, see Thomas D. Brooks, First
Amendment-Penalty Enhancement for Hate Crimes: Content Regulation, Questionable
State Interests and Non-Traditional Sentencing, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 703
(1994).
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After an extensive review of the facts,"° Justice Kennard considered the
constitutional effect of jury misinstruction, remarking that misinstruction
as to an element of a crime violates the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments,5 but misinstruction on an enhancement element is only a
constitutional violation if the legislature intended the provision to be
parallel to a substantive crime. She then launched into a discussion of
the proper characterization of sentence enhancements. 3 Justice
Kennard ultimately concluded that because sentence enhancements re-
quire the same pretrial and statutory proof procedures,55 because re-
trial of both is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, 6 and because
both have the same consequences of increasing a defendant's original
sentence,"7 "the Legislature must have intended enhancements to be the
functional equivalent of criminal offenses"; therefore, jury trial rights and
burdens of proof must also attach to them5
50. Wims, 10 Cal. 4th at 318-20, 895 P.2d at 91-92, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255-56
(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
51. Id. at 320, 895 P.2d at 93, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
52. Id. at 322, 895 P.2d at 94, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 258 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
53. Id. at 322-23, 895 P.2d at 94, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 258 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
54. Id. at 323, 895 P.2d at 94-95, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 258-59 (Kennard, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
55. Id. at 323-24, 895 P.2d at 95, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 259 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting). "Most significantly, unlike sentencing factors, whose existence is ordi-
narily determined by the trial judge, the Legislature has created a statutory right to
have a jury determine the truth or falsity of an enhancement." Id. (citing People v.
Wiley, 9 Cal. 4th 580, 889 P.2d 541, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 347 (1995)).
56. Id. at 324 n.6, 895 P.2d at 95 n.6, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 259 n.6 (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting). See U.S. CONST. amend V.
57. Id. at 324, 895 P.2d at 95, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 259 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting); see 3 B.E. WrrnUN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Pun-
ishment for Crime § 1474 (2d ed. 1989) (explaining calculation of additional sentenc-
es).
58. Wims, 10 Cal. 4th at 324, 895 P.2d at 95, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 259 (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Justice Kennard then reviewed California Supreme Court
decisions which support this conclusion. Id. at 324-27, 895 P.2d at 95-97, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 259-61 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Kennard cited
People v. Superior Court (Mendella), 33 Cal. 3d 754, 661 P.2d 1081, 191 Cal. Rptr. 1,
for a historical background of sentence enhancements and the proposition that sen-
tence enhancements are analogous to criminal offenses. Wims, 10 Cal. 4th at 325, 895
P.2d at 96, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting); see also
Mark W. Owens, California's Three Strikes Law: Desperate Times Require Desperate
Measures-But Will it Work?, 26 PAc. L.J. 881 (1995) (examining early sentence en-
hancement history). She also offered People v. Hernandez, 46 Cal. 3d 194, 757 P.2d
1013, 249 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1988), as further support for her position. Wims, 10 Cal. 4th
at 325, 895 P.2d at 96, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissent-
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Finally, Justice Kennard considered whether the trial court's insin-
struction was prejudicial.' She carefully evaluated each of the three ele-
ments of the section 12022(b) enhancement,'O finding that the jury ver-
dict form forced the jury to make particularized findings as to the first
two elements,6 but because the third element was not explained, "the
jury did not determine the truth or falsity of th[at] element." 2 Thus, Jus-
tice Kennard undertook that duty, resolving that, as to defendant Ford,
the evidence was so convincing that the jury could not have found that
he did not personally use the knife,' but defendant Wims was likely
charged with the enhancement allegation, not because the jury found
irrefutable evidence of his personal use of a knife, but because he was
an accomplice and the jury was confused.' Therefore, Justice Kennard
found reversible error on Wims's sentence enhancement and upheld its
application to Ford.'
ing). She emphasized that the majority's holding contradicts the Hernandez decision
because, Hernandez held that enhancements "are ... subject to federal due process
requirements." Id. at 326, 895 P.2d at 96-97, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260 (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Finally, Justice Kennard criticized the majority's use of
Nichols v. McCormick, 929 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1991), declaring that the Montana stat-
ute in that case exhibited no likeness to section 12022(b), thus rendering Nichols
inapplicable. Wims, 10 Cal. 4th at 326-27, 895 P.2d at 97, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 261
(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). Because California statutory and case law
characterize sentence enhancements as functionally equivalent to
substantive offenses, failure to specifically instruct the jury in this case violated
defendants' Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 327, 895 P.2d at 97, 41
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 261 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
59. Wims, 10 Cal. 4th at 327, 895 P.2d at 97, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 261 (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
60. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). The elements that must be found
true are: (1) the use of "a deadly or dangerous weapon," (2) "defendant's display of
the weapon in a menacing manner or intentional use of the weapon to strike a hu-
man being during the offense," and (3) "the defendant, rather than an accomplice,
must have wielded the weapon." Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
61. Id. at 327-28, 895 P.2d at 97-98, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 261-62 (Kennard, J., con-
curring and dissenting). The jury verdict form read: "We further find the Use of
Deadly Weapon Allegation (Violation of Penal Code section 12022Cb) to be _ "
and [bleneath the line were the choices: "True [or] Not True." Id. at 328 n.8, 895
P.2d at 97 n.8, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 262 n.8 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting) (quot-
ing jury instruction form).
62. Id. at 328, 895 P.2d at 98, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 262 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
63. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
64. Id. at 328-29, 895 P.2d at 98, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 262 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
65. Id. at 329, 895 P.2d at 98, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 262 (Kennard, J., concurring and
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III. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
In 1976, California enacted the Determinate Sentencing Law, pulling
sentencing provisions from throughout the penal code and designating
them as enhancements.' Thus, the court removed sentencing provisions
from the individual substantive crimes and placed in their own sections,
prompting a debate over the enhancement provisions."
Before the court's decision in Wims, confusion surrounded the
proper characterization of sentence enhancements. Although the Wims
court made headway in this area, its decision only affects cases involving
California Penal Code section 12022(b). Other sentence enhancement
provisions will require a thorough analysis of legislative intent before
their exact natures can be determined. Future cases will likely follow the
Wims approach and determine first, whether the court erred, second,
whether that error violated the defendant's constitutional rights, and
lastly, whether the error was prejudicial, by applying the compound test
used in the Wims decision.
If nothing else, the message to defendants faced with a section
12022(b) allegation is clear: the threshold for reversible error, even
where the trial court forgets to instruct the jury, is a high one.
JENNIFER A. POPICK
dissenting).
66. Id. at 325, 895 P.2d at 96, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
67. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
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V. LANDLORD AND TENANT
When the government requires that real property be
brought into statutory compliance, and its condition
is not the direct result of the lessee's specific use, the
court must undertake a two-part analysis to deter-
mine whether the lessor or the lessee is liable for the
cost of compliance: (1) the court must evaluate the
extent to which the terms of the lease suggest that
the lessee is liable, and (2) the court must then look
at circumstantial factors surrounding the lease.
Unless both parts of this analysis point to liability
on the lessee, the lessor will bear the cost of compli-
ance: Hadian v. Schwartz.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Hadian v. Schwartz,' the California Supreme Court considered
whether the parties to a lease intended for the lessee to be responsible
for the cost of complying with statutory requirements; the cost was unre-
lated to the lessee's use of the property.2 The trial court held that under
1. 8 Cal. 4th 836, 884 P.2d 46, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 589 (1994). Justice Arabian wrote
the opinion for a unanimous court. Id. at 839, 884 P.2d at 47, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
590.
2. Id. at 840, 884 P.2d at 48, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 591. On April 14, 1984, Hadian
and Schwartz entered into a lease for commercial property. Id. They used a "fill-in-
the-blank" "net" lease form published by the American Industrial Real Estate Associa-
tion, making several alterations and attaching an addendum. Id. The lease was for a
six-month term at a monthly rent of $650 with an option to renew the lease at an
increased monthly payment of $800. Id. Hadian and Schwartz modified the lease to
certify that Hadian, the lessor, made no warranties as to the property. Id. Schwartz
assumed liability for the cost of compliance with any "applicable statutes, ordinances,
rules, regulations, orders, covenants and restrictions of record, and restrictions" that
were in effect during any part of the lease, regulating his use of the property as a
bar and cabaret. Id. at 841, 884 P.2d at 48, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 591. On October 1,
1986, before the lease ended on July 24, 1987, Schwartz opted to renew the lease for
an additional five years. Id.
About five months after Schwartz opted to renew the lease, the City of Los
Angeles informed Hadian that she was responsible for repairing her building to meet
earthquake standards enacted in 1981. Id. at 841, 884 P.2d at 49, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
592. She subsequently met with Schwartz in an effort to make him agree to pay for
a structural survey and any necessary quake-proofing. Id. Schwartz denied all liability.
Id. Hadian went ahead with the repairs, which included complete reconstruction of
the building's frame and a new roof. Id. at 841-42, 884 P.2d at 49, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d
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the terms of the lease Schwartz was liable for the cost of compliance.'
The court of appeal affirmed,4 basing its holding entirely upon the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's opinion in Glenn R. Sewell Sheet Metal, Inc. v.
Loverde' The supreme court reversed, finding that the lessee was not
liable under the terms of the lease if his use of the property had no ef-
fect on the lessor's duty to seismically retrofit the building.'
II TREATMENT
Justice Arabian began the majority opinion by first analyzing the
supreme court's decision in Sewell. The court held that if a lessee
changes the use of the property, and that change in use requires com-
pliance with laws, the lessee will be liable for the cost of compliance.'
The court made certain to distinguish the scenario in Sewell from those
cases where the lessee's use does not cause the government's order of
compliance.' Turning to the instant case, the court further stated that
"compliance with the laws" clause obligated Schwartz, the lessee, to
"'comply promptly with all applicable statutes ... regulating the use by
at 592. The total cost of the survey and repairs was $34,450.26. Id. at 842, 884 P.2d
at 49, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592. After the repairs were completed, Hadian filed suit to
recover the costs from Schwartz. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.; 70 Cal. 2d 666, 451 P.2d 721, 75 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1969).
6. Hadian, 8 Cal. 4th at 842, 884 P.2d at 48, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592. The court
reviewed the decision de novo because the facts were undisputed. Id. at 842 ni1, 884
P.2d at 49 n.1, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592 n.l.
7. 70 Cal. 2d 666, 451 P.2d 721, 75 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1969). The court characterized
the earlier SeweU opinion as "apt to be misinterpreted as one which, in the search
for the parties' intent, exalts a text-bound logic over a close consideration not only
of the terms of the lease but of the circumstances surrounding its making." Hadian,
8 Cal. 4th at 843, 884 P.2d at 50, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592. The court continued, distin-
guishing Sewell from the case at bar. Id. In Sewell the court noted that the specific
use of the commercial property by the lessee gave rise to the need for regulatory
compliance. Id. Here, however, there was no causal connection between the lessee's
use and the expenditures required of the lessor. Id.; see also Brown v. Green, 8 Cal.
4th 812, 824, 884 P.2d 55, 62, 35 Cal. Rpti. 2d 598, 605 (similarly distinguishing
SeweU).
8. SeweU, 70 Cal. 2d at 672, 451 P.2d at 725, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 893. See generally 4
B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Real Property § 594 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp.
1995) (examining the respective duties of landlord and tenant to make repairs as re-
quired by government); Nancy Ann Connery, Legal Compliance: Landlord and Tenant
Responsibilities for Work Required by ADA; and Other Environmental Issues, 405
PRACT. LAW INST./REAL ESTATE 391 (1994) (discussing liability of landlord and tenant
when new laws and regulations are adopted).
9. Hadian, 8 Cal. 4th at 843, 884 P.2d at 50, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593. The court
went on to state that, "[t]he distinction is, moreover, consistent with both common
sense and a reasonable construction of the lease provision." Id.
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the lessee of the premises.'"'0 The court noted that this language did not
require the lessee to comply with all laws that affect the property, but
only those laws which regulate the use of the property." By its literal
terms, the compliance clause did not obligate the lessee to comply with
laws not regulating the lessee's specific use of the property. 2
Since the compliance clause was ambiguous as to the intention of
the parties regarding general liability for compliance, the court consid-
ered the overall provisions of the lease and the surrounding circumstanc-
es. 3 The court ultimately adopted a two-part analysis for determining
the intent of the parties to assign liability for compliance expenditures
that do not arise from the specific use of the property."
First, the court looked to the language of the lease to determine the
intent of the parties.' Second, the court used the six factors enumerat-
ed in Sewell to examine the circumstances surrounding the making of the
lease and determine whether the parties intended to hold the lessee gen-
erally liable.'" The court asserted that if both prongs of the analysis
point to lessee liability for compliance, then the lessee must pay for all
necessary repairs.'7 However, if the circumstantial factors indicate that
10. Id. Brown, 8 Cal. 4th at 824, 884 P.2d at 62, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 605. See gen-
erally 2 FRIEDMAN ON LEASES, Compliance with Laws § 11.1 (3d ed. 1990) (discussing
compliance with laws clauses in lease agreements); 4 B.E. WrrKTN, SUMMARY OF CAU-
FORNIA LAW, Real Property §§ 543-553 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995) (covering leases
generally). See also 4 B.E. WrrluN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Property §§
577-590 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995) (discussing fitness for use, repairs, and states
that split on extending rules to commercial leases); 1 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAM-
FoRNiA LAw, Contracts § 13 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995) (discussing statutory obliga-
tion).
11. Hadian, 8 Cal. 4th at 844, 884 P.2d at 50, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593. The court
of appeal's statement that Schwartz could not use the property as a bar and cabaret
if he did not comply with the requirement to "quake-proof" the property was too
broad; no one could use the property if it did not comply with seismic retrofit regu-
lations. Id.
12. Id. It would not make sense for the lessee to be liable for all governmental
demands, including those demands that would only benefit the property owner. Id. at
844, 884 P.2d at 51, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594. See generally 14 CAL. JUR. 3D Contracts
§§ 150-207 (1974 & Supp. 1994) (discussing construction and interpretation of con-
tracts).
13. Hadian, 8 Cal. 4th at 844, 884 P.2d at 51, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594. See general-
ly 1 B.E. WITuIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts §§ 681-698 (9th ed. 1987 &
Supp. 1995) (discussing general approaches to contract interpretation).
14. Hadian, 8 Cal. 4th at 844, 884 P.2d at 51, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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the parties did not intend the lessee to be liable, then the lessor must
bear the expense. 8
Applying this two-part analysis to the case at hand, noted that the
lease here was labeled a "net" lease, and that the lessee controlled most
of the incidents of ownership.'9 The court also focused its attention on
the overall provisions of the lease, including its life and the extent to
which control was transferred to the lessee." This lease, the court rea-
soned, transferred almost all of the incidents of ownership to the lessee;
however, the lease indicated that liability for compliance with laws not
relating to the use of the property should fall on the lessor.2 Further-
more, the court found the term of the lease to be comparatively short,'
and further determined that the lessor had agreed to pay most of the
property taxes and insurance.23 The property owner also continued to
own all of the "fixtures, operating systems and other improvements" in
the building.24 Finally, the court concluded that the lessor retained the
benefits of ownership, and the lessee did not assume all the risks for the
property's continued value.2"
Second, the court applied the six factors enumerated in SeweU to
determine whether the parties intended to hold the lessee generally lia-
ble.26 The first factor is the ratio between the cost of compliance and
the total amount of rent paid over the entire lease.2" Here, the court not-
ed, the cost to "quake proof" the building was almost one and a half
times the rent for the first three years.' Furthermore, the court found
that even if it used the total rent for eight years, the cost to comply
would be almost half of the rent to be paid.29 Thus, if Schwartz was lia-
18. Id.
19. Id. at 845-46, 884 P.2d at 51-52, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595; see also Brown v.
Green, 8 Cal. 4th at 827-28, 884 P.2d at 64-65, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 607-08.
20. Hadian, 8 Cal. 4th at 846, 884 P.2d at 52, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595 (stating that
although there are some characteristics of a true net lease, the terms regarding trans-
fer of ownership imply that this lease is not a true net lease).
21. Id.
22. Id. The term of the lease was three years with an option to renew for another
five years. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 846-47, 884 P.2d at 52, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595; see Durand H. Van
Doren, Some Suggestions for the Drafting of Long Term Net and Percentage Leases,
51 COLUM. L. REv. 186 (1951) (discussing issues to consider when drafting a net lease
to clearly allocate liability for repairs).
26. Hadian, 8 Cal. 4th at 846-50, 884 P.2d at 52-54, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595-97.
27. Id. at 847, 884 P.2d at 52, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595.
28. Id. at 847, 884 P.2d at 52-53, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595-96.
29. Id. at 847, 884 P.2d at 53, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596. In contrast, in Brown v.
Green, 8 Cal. 4th 812, 884 P.2d 55, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 598, the cost to comply was less
than five percent of the total rent to be paid over the 15 year lease. Id. at 830, 884
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ble for the cost of compliance, he would be placed under a fairly great
hardship.
The second factor the court considered was the duration of the
lease.3 The lease was initially for a term of three years with an option
to renew for an additional five years.32 The court asserted that it would
view a short lease term as an indication that the parties did not intend
the lessee to bear the cost of compliance where the changes would main-
ly benefit the owner.
The third factor was the amount of benefit to the lessee compared
to that of the property owner. ' The court found in the instant case that
the property owner would receive the benefit from the alterations to the
building long after the five year lease expired. The court found similar
significance in the fact that the governmental compliance order was not
a result of the lessee's use of the property.'
The court also looked to whether the act of compliance is structural
or non-structural.37 The repairs to the Hadian property were obviously
structural in nature, which reinforced the court's finding that the owner
should be liable for the cost of repairs.
The court next considered the extent to which the lessee's right to
enjoyment of the premises was infringed during the time that the build-
ing was repaired. Finally, the court evaluated the likelihood that the
parties actually contemplated having to comply with the specific law at
P.2d at 66, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 609.
30. Id. See generaliy 4 B.E. WITUIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Property
§ 593 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995) (stating that there is an interpretation against un-
due burden).
31. Hadian, 8 Cal. 4th at 847, 884 P.2d at 53, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596.
32. Id. at 848, 884 P.2d at 53, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596.
33. Id. at 847-48, 884 P.2d at 53, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596. The court noted:
[C]ourts are reluctant to construe a repair or compliance clause literally
where the term of the lease is short, the lessee has little time in which to
amortize the cost of repairs over the life of the lease, and the cost of repair
or compliance represents a substantial percentage of the aggregate rent over
the term.
Id. at 848, 884 P.2d at 53, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 848, 884 P.2d at 54, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597.
38. Id. at 848-49, 884 P.2d at 54, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597.
39. Id. at 849, 884 P.2d at 54, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597.
1071
issue." The court asserted that if the parties considered the specific
law, this factor would favor releasing the lessee from liability for the cost
of compliance.4' Here, the court found the record to be unclear on these
last two factors.42 Hence, based on such rationale, the court found that
the lessee was not liable under the terms of the lease.43
Ill. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
After considering the relevant factors, the court held that the parties
did not intend to hold the lessee liable for the cost of complying with
laws and regulations not arising out of the lessee's particular use of the
property."
Hadian is significant because it will require courts to look at the
issue of liability on a case by case basis. Furthermore, it prevents the
lessee from having to unfairly bear the burden of compliance with laws
that are unrelated to the lessee's use. However, it should be noted that
the court's decision in Broum v. Green indicated with equal authority
that liability will not be automatically shifted onto the shoulders of the
lessor.45 Therefore, while this case seems to add an element of ambigu-
ity to landlord and tenant law, it is nonetheless significant because it
clarifies the level of inquiry required by the trier of fact.
JILL ELjZABETH LUSHER
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. However, it is more likely that the building owner would be aware of the
possibility of having to make structural changes. Id.
43. Id. at 842, 884 P.2d at 48, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592.
44. Id. at 850, 884 P.2d at 54, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597.
45. Brown v. Green, 8 Cal. 4th 812, 817-18, 822, 825, 884 P.2d 55, 57-58, 61, 63, 35
Cal. Rptr. 2d 598, 600-01, 604, 606 (1994).
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VI. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
An action for malicious prosecution lies when at
least one of several possible grounds of recovery
lacks probable cause and is brought with malice:
Crowley v. Katleman.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Crowley v. Katleman,' the California Supreme Court considered
whether the executor of a will could maintain an action for malicious
prosecution against a testator's wife and her attorneys when five of six
theories of their will contest lacked probable cause.2 In its decision be-
low,3 the court of appeal criticized the supreme court's ruling regarding
the alternate theory rule from Bertero v. National General Corp.4 The
1. 8 Cal. 4th 666, 881 P.2d 1083, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386 (1994). Justice Mosk deliv-
ered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Kennard,
Baxter, George, and Werdegar joined. Id. at 671-96, 881 P.2d at 1084-1100, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 387-403. Justice Arabian wrote a dissenting opinion. Id. at 696-703, 881
P.2d at 1100-05, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 403-08 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 676, 881 P.2d at 1087, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 390. Beldon Kateman and
Carole Katleman were first married in 1973. Id. at 672, 881 P.2d at 1084, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 387. Two years later they divorced, and Arthur Crowley represented
Beldon Katleman in the divorce proceedings. Id. As a result, Carole Katleman became
hostile towards Crowley. Id. In 1976, Mr. Katleman executed a will naming Crowley,
his attorney and best friend, as the executor and principal heir of his $10 million
estate. Id. Crowley did not participate in the drafting or the execution of the will. Id.
The Katlemans remarried in 1980. Id. In 1988, Beldon Katleman died without revoking
his previous will or executing a subsequent will. Id. at 673, 881 P.2d at 1084, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 387. Shortly after his death, Crowley offered Mrs. Katleman one-half of
her husband's estate, but she rejected the offer. Id. Soon thereafter, Mrs. Katleman
filed a will contest that sought to invalidate her husband's will on six possible theo-
ries of recovery: (1) undue influence, (2) revocation of the will, (3) execution of a
subsequent will, (4) lack of testamentary capacity, (5) lack of due execution, and (6)
fraud. Id. at 673, 881 P.2d at 1084, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 388. Although a presumption
of undue influence arose from Crowley's attorney-client relationship with Mr.
Katleman, the probate court found "the presumption had been rebutted by over-
whelming evidence." Crowley v. Katleman, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1585, 1591, 19 Cal. Rptr.
2d 654, 656 (1993), affd, 8 Cal. 4th 666, 881 P.2d 1083, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386 (1994).
Crowley then filed a malicious prosecution action against Mrs. Katleman and her
attorneys, alleging that all of the grounds asserted in the will contest, except the
undue influence ground, had been brought maliciously and without probable cause.
Crowley, 8 Cal. 4th at 674, 881 P.2d at 1085-86, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 388-89.
3. Crowley, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 1585, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 655.
4. 13 Cal. 3d 43, 57 n.5, 529 P.2d 608, 618 n.5, 118 Cal. Rptr 184, 194 n.5 (1974)
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California Supreme Court granted review to revisit the public policy
supporting the alternate theory rule governing malicious prosecution
claims.' Reaffirming its holding in Bertero, the court held that an action
charging multiple grounds of liability where at least one of those grounds
was asserted with malice and without probable cause will give rise to a
valid claim for malicious prosecution.6
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
At issue was whether one could maintain a malicious prosecution
action when some but not all of one's theories of liability lacked proba-
ble cause.7 Because the appellate court found the factual circumstances
surrounding the will contest "virtually identical to Bertero," the supreme
court had little difficulty finding liability pursuant to its alternate theory
rule.' However, because the court of appeal denounced the Bertero rule
(concluding that "an action for malicious prosecution lies when but one of alternate
theories of recovery is maliciously asserted").
5. Crowley, 8 Cal. 4th at 671, 881 P.2d at 1084, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 387.
6. Id. (citing Bertero, 13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1974)). A
cause of action for malicious prosecution exists when the underlying action was: (1)
initiated by the defendant, but terminated in the plaintiffs favor; (2) without probable
cause; and (3) with malice. Bertero, 13 Cal. 3d at 50, 529 P.2d at 613-14, 118 Cal.
Rptr. at 189-90; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 653-681B (1977); 5 B.E.
WITK N, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Torts § 431 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995) (dis-
cussing the tortious nature of malicious prosecution claims). For a discussion on the
elements of malicious prosecution, see 6 CAL. JUR. 3D Assault and Other Wilful Torts
§ 315 (1988 & Supp. 1995); 54 CJ.S. Malicious Prosecution § 5 (1987 & Supp. 1995);
52 AM. JUR. 2D MAUCIOUS PROSECUTION § 6 (1970 & Supp. 1995).
Probable cause is held to both a subjective and objective standard. Bertero, 13
Cal. 3d at 55, 529 P.2d at 617, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 193. To defeat the element of proba-
ble cause, a defendant's "suspicion [must be] founded on circumstances warranting a
reasonable man's belief that the charge is true." 5 B.E. WrrIGN, SUMMARY OF CALIFOR-
NIA LAW, Torts § 447 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995); see also Mark G. Kisicki, Califor-
nia Supreme Court Survey, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 300 (1989) (reviewing Sheldon Appel
Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863, 765 P.2d 498, 254 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1989)). "But
if the initiator [subjectively] knows that his claim is groundless he cannot have an
actual or honest belief in its validity, and he may not escape liability for commencing
an action based on such a claim merely because a reasonable man might have be-
lieved it was meritorious." Bertero, 13 Cal. 3d at 55, 529 P.2d at 617, 118 Cal. Rptr.
at 193. See generally 6 CAL. JUR. 3D Assault and Other Wilful Torts § 330 (1988 &
Supp. 1995) (discussing "want of probable cause"); 52 AM. JUR. 2D Malicious Prosecu-
tion §§ 50-55 (1970 & Supp. 1995) (discussing same).
7. Crowley, 8 Cal. 4th at 676, 881 P.2d at 1087, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 390; see su-
pra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
8. Crowley v. Katleman, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1585, 1599, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 654, 662
(1993), affd, 8 Cal. 4th 666, 881 P.2d 1083, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386 (1994).
9. Crowley, 8 Cal. 4th at 679, 881 P.2d at 1089, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 392.
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as being antiquated and a waste of judicial economy,'0 Justice Mosk
spent much of the majority opinion defending its precedent and criticiz-
ing the primary right rule that the court of appeal offered as a replace-
ment."
1. The Alternate Theory Rule vs. The Primary Right Theory
Because probable cause existed as to the undue influence ground as
a matter of law, the defendants contended that the plaintiff should have
been precluded from bringing an action for malicious prosecution. 2
However, the alternate theory rule, as articulated in Bertero, states that
an action for malicious prosecution lies "when but one of alternate theo-
ries of recovery is maliciously asserted." 3 The defendants attacked the
rule, claiming that they were compelled to assert all possible claims in
the will contest because failure to raise a claim would result in its waiv-
er." The court rejected this argument finding that "'[a] litigant is never
compelled to file a malicious and fabricated action.'"'" The defendants
10. Crowley, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 1602, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 664. The court conclud-
ed, "Were we not so bound, we would adopt the primary right rule .... Bertero's
alternate theory rule invites a multitude of unwarranted litigation, encourages exces-
sive and repetitive litigation, discourages citizens from bringing meritorious civil dis-
putes to the courts, and is inconsistent with modern pleading practice." Id. (citations
omitted).
11. Crowley, 8 Cal. 4th at 679-96, 881 P.2d at 1089-1100, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 392-
403.
12. Id. at 675-76, 881 P.2d at 1086, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 389.
13. Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 57 n.5, 529 P.2d 608, 618 n.5,
118 Cal. Rptr. 184, 194 n.5 (1974); see Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 295 P.2d
405 (1956) (holding that one cannot escape liability by combining baseless and meri-
torious claims); Singleton v. Perry, 45 Cal. 2d 489, 289 P.2d 794 (1955) (reasoning
that a frivolous charge is not less injurious when coupled with one that is well-
founded). In Bertero, the plaintiff sued National General Corp., his employer, for
breach of their employment contract Bertero, 13 Cal. 3d at 49, 529 P.2d at 613, 118
Cal. Rptr. at 189. By way of affirmative defenses, the corporation attacked the con-
tract on three grounds: (1) Bertero obtained his contract by duress; (2) Bertero ob-
tained the contract by undue influence; and (3) Bertero gave no consideration for the
contract. Id. The defendant employer then filed a cross-complaint to recover salary
already paid to Bertero alleging the same three grounds for recovery. Id. At trial,
Bertero prevailed in all respects and the employer's cross-complaint was dismissed
with prejudice. Id. Bertero then filed a suit for malicious prosecution and ultimately
prevailed, even though only one of the three theories in the cross-complaint lacked
probable cause. Id. at 49-50, 529 P.2d at 613, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
14. Crowley, 8 Cal. 4th at 679, 881 P.2d at 1088, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 391.
15. Id. (quoting Bertero, 13 Cal. 3d at 52, 529 P.2d at 615, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 191).
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also criticized the alternate theory rule contending that the rule would
prevent future plaintiffs from being able to rely on multiple theories of
recovery." The court also rejected this argument, stating that litigants
could still assert multiple theories so long as they reasonably believed in
their merits.'7 The court cautioned against plaintiffs "'pursu[ing] shotgun
tactics by proceeding on counts and theories which they know or should
know to be groundless. '"
The defendants further argued that the will contest amounted to
one "primary right," and that because probable cause existed to one of
the theories upon which they could prevail, the entire action should
withstand a malicious prosecution claim. The majority disagreed, rea-
soning that the primary right theory did not concern itself with individual
claims; rather, it served as a litigant's basic right not to be subjected to
injury.2° The court reasoned that the only way a party could show prob-
able cause for the primary right as a whole was to demonstrate probable
cause for all of the theories upon which they relied.2 ' Satisfied that the
primary right theory did not apply, the court turned to examine public
policy underlying malicious prosecution claims.22
2. The Policy Trilemma: Judicial Economy, Access to the Courts,
and a Wronged Individual's Right to Legal Redress
The majority recognized that malicious prosecution has long been a
"disfavored cause of action" because it burdens the judicial system with
additional litigation and discourages people from accessing the courts for
fear of countersuit.' Additionally, the court warned of the two dangers
16. Id. at 678, 881 P.2d at 1088, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 391.
17. Id. The court reasoned that pleadings could be amended once legal theories
proved to be untenable. Id.
18. Id. (quoting Bertero, 13 Cal. 3d at 57, 529 P.2d at 618, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 194).
19. Id. at 682-83, 881 P.2d at 1091, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 394.
20. Id. at 683, 881 P.2d at 1091, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 394. The court added:
"[D]efendants' argument would have converted the primary right theory into a 'prima-
ry theory theory.'" Id. (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 683 n.l, 881 P.2d at 1092 n.ll, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 395 n.ll.
22. Id. at 683, 881 P.2d at 1091-92, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 394-95. See generally Note,
Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A Historical Analysis,
88 YALE U. 1218 (1979) (discussing the split between jurisdictions adopting the mod-
em rule and those still adhering to the English rule, which requires the pleading and
proof of special damages).
23. Crowley, 8 Cal. 4th at 680, 881 P.2d at 1089, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 392 (citing
Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863, 872, 765 P.2d 498, 501-02, 254
Cal. Rptr. 336, 340 (1989)). The court warned, however, that "'[tihis convenient phrase
should not be employed to defeat a legitimate cause of action.'" Id. (quoting Bertero
v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 53, 529 P.2d 608, 615, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184, 191
(1974)). The court also noted that the will contest brought by defendants was a
"disfavored" cause of action because the law favors the prompt settlement of estates.
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of frivolous lawsuits.24 Not only is the individual defendant harmed by
defending spiteful and baseless claims,25 but the judicial process is also
harmed by those who "use [] the courts'. . . as instruments with which
to maliciously injure their fellow men.'"2" Weighing the underlying poli-
cies, the court reasoned that the two competing judicial economy argu-
ments stood on equal footing.27 While the court acknowledged that en-
couraging judicial access is important, it concluded that when the under-
lying litigation is frivolous, the policy of redressing individual harm
caused by groundless lawsuits must prevail.28
B. Justice Arabian's Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Justice Arabian criticized the majority for
"perpetuat[ing] dubious law for no better reason than that it exists."'
Like the court of appeal, Justice Arabian thought the court's rule was
inconsistent with modem pleading and argued that the primary right
theory could be effectively applied by analogy.' Justice Arabian cited
several cases that were skeptical of the tort.' Finally, he concluded that
the foundation of the Bertero holding had been eroded by statutes autho-
rizing judges to sanction attorneys and their clients who assert frivolous
Id. at 680 n.8, 881 P.2d at 1089 n.8, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 392 n.8. (citing Estate of
Horn, 219 Cal. App. 3d 67, 71, 268 Cal. Rptr. 41, 43 (1990)).
24. Id. at 677, 881 P.2d at 1087, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 390.
25. Id. at 693, 881 P.2d at 1098-99, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 401-02 (quoting Bertero, 13
Cal. 3d at 50-51, 529 P.2d at 614, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 190).
26. Id. (quoting Bertero, 13 Cal. 3d at 51, 529 P.2d at 614, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 190).
27. Id. at 694, 881 P.2d at 1099, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 402.
28. Id. at 695, 881 P.2d at 1100, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 403.
29. Id. at 696, 881 P.2d at 1100, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 403 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 697, 881 P.2d at 1101, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 404 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
Justice Arabian stated two reasons why the primary right theory should be adopted.
As most attorneys are uncertain which theory will have the highest likelihood of
success at trial, the primary right theory would enable them to best advocate the
rights of their clients without fear of countersut. Id. at 698, 881 P.2d at 1102, 34
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 405 (Arabian, J., dissenting). In addition, defending against multiple
claims is "not qualitatively so different" from defending a single theory when the
underlying action stems from a single occurrence. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 700, 881 P.2d at 1103, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 406 (Arabian, J., dissenting)
(citing Rubin v. Green, 4 Cal. 4th 1187, 847 P.2d 1044, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828 (1993);
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear Steams & Co., 50 Cal. 3d 1118, 791 P.2d 587, 270
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1990); Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 786 P.2d 365, 266 Cal. Rptr.
638 (1990); Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863, 765 P.2d 498, 254
Cal. Rptr. 336 (1989); Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss &
Karma, Inc., 42 Cal. 3d 1157, 728 P.2d 1202, 232 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1986)).
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claims.2 Justice Arabian reasoned that, in contrast to malicious
prosecution claims, statutory remedies promote judicial economy, are
less restrictive to judicial access, and provide more appropriate penal-
ties.'
Ill. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
It is estimated that malicious prosecution and abuse of process law-
suits account for ten percent of the malpractice claims filed against Cali-
fornia attorneys.' While the California Supreme Court has declined to
ease malicious prosecution standards in recent years and has recognized
that statutory sanctions provide "the most promising remedies" for the
frivolous litigation problem,' it ultimately discarded an opportunity to
discourage derivative litigation.' To be sure, the supreme court did not
relax the standards for malicious prosecution;37 however, by narrowly
32. Id. at 697, 881 P.2d at 1101, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 404 (Arabian, J., dissenting). See
generally John W. Wade, On Frivolous Litigation: A Study of Tort Liability and
Procedural Sanctions, 14 HoFsTRA L REV. 433, 457 (1986) (discussing state statutes
and rules designed to deter groundless litigation); John M. Johnson & G. Edward
Cassidy, Frivolous Lawsuits and Defensive Responses to Them-What Relief is Avail-
able?, 36 ALA. L REv. 927 (1985) (contrasting statutory remedies with common law
remedies for misuse of litigation).
California Civil Procedure Code § 128.5, which was effective at the time this
case was heard, provided, in relevant part- "Every trial court may order a party, the
party's attorney, or both to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees,
incurred by another party as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous
or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay." CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West
1989 & Supp. 1995).
California Civil Procedure Code § 128.7, which was modeled after Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and became effective January 1, 1995, "authorizes
trial judges to sanction attorneys, their firms and clients for violating a certification
that a complaint (as well as other filings) is not filed 'primarily for an improper pur-
pose,' that the claims are warranted by existing law (with certain exceptions), and
that allegations have factual support." Crowley, 8 Cal. 4th at 702 n.2, 881 P.2d at
1104 n.2, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 407 n.2 (Arabian, J., dissenting) (citing CAL CIV. PROC.
CODE § 128.7(b)(1) (West 1989 & Supp. 1995)).
33. Crowley, 8 Cal. 4th at 702, 881 P.2d at 1104, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 407 (Arabian,
J., dissenting).
34. James D. Hadfield, Avoiding Malicious-Prosecution suits, 2 CAL LAW., May
1982, at 33.
35. Sheldon Appel, 47 Cal. 3d at 873-74, 765 P.2d at 503, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
36. Crowley, 8 Cal. 4th at 703, 881 P.2d at 1105, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 408 (Arabian,
J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 681, 881 P.2d at 1090, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 393. As the court noted, "[t]o
follow the rule of Bertero today is not to 'expand' the tort of malicious prosecution,
because it has been the law of this state for 20 years." Id.
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construing the legislative intent behind the statutory remedies,' the al-
ternate theory rule remains a lethal weapon in countersuits.
In recent decades, attorneys have joined their clients as deep pock-
ets from which aggrieved individuals may recover,' and alternative
pleading has become commonplace.4 ° Despite a host of statutory reme-
dies designed to deter frivolous litigation,4 the lure of punitive damag-
es-in addition to general damages and court costs-may be enough to
entice litigious defendants to gamble on larger jury verdicts.
JONATHAN SIMONDS PYATr
38. Id. at 687-88, 881 P.2d at 1094-95, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 397-98.
39. See, e.g., Williams v. Coombs, 179 Cal. App. 3d 626, 224 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1986);
Tool Research & Eng'g Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291
(1975); see also Lee A. Pizzimenti, Note, A Lawyer's Duty to Reject Groundless Lit-
igation, 26 WAYNE L REV. 1561 (1980) (suggesting that negligence suits against attor-
neys would deter abuse of the legal system); Sandra C. Segal, Comment, It is Time
to End the Lawyer's Immunity from Countersuit, 35 UCLA L. REV. 99 (1987) (en-
couraging attorney liability for malicious prosecution to discourage frivolous litiga-
tion). But see Wade, supra note 32, at 433. See generally 5 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF
CAIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 452-53 (1988) (summarizing Williams and Tool Research).
40. Crowley v. Katleman, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1585, 1602, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 654, 664
(1993), affd, 8 Cal. 4th 666, 881 P.2d 1083, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386 (1994).
41. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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VII. REFERENDUM
Article XI, section (1)(b) of the California Constitu-
tion neither restricts nor secures the local right of
referendum on employee compensation decisions,
while Government Code section 25123(e)s exemp-
tion from referendum is constitutionally justified
because it advances legislative goals of statewide
concern: Voters for Responsible Retirement v.
Board of Supervisors.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Voters for Responsible Retirement v. Board of Supervisors,' the
California Supreme Court discussed whether article XI, section 1, clause
b [hereinafter XI(1)(b)]2 of the California Constitution restricted or guar-
anteed the voters' right to hold a referendum on public employee com-
pensation decisions made by the county board of supervisors.3 The court
held that article XI(1)(b) neither restricted nor guaranteed the right to
referendum in such circumstances.4 Additionally, the court reversed the
1. 8 Cal. 4th 765, 884 P.2d 645, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 814 (1994). Justice Mosk deliv-
ered the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices Arabian, Baxter,
George, Werdegar and Kennard joined. Id. 769-87, 884 P.2d 647-58, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d
816-27. In addition, Justice Kennard wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 786-90, 884
P.2d at 658-60, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 827-29 (Kennard, J., concurring).
2. Article XI(b)(1) of the California Constitution provides in pertinent part:
The Legislature shall provide for county powers, an elected county sheriff, an
elected district attorney, an elected assessor, and an elected governing body
in each county .... [E]ach governing body shall prescribe by ordinance the
compensation of its members, but the ordinance prescribing such compensa-
tion shall be subject to referendum.
CAL. CONST. art. XI. § 1, cl. b.
3. Voters, 8 Cal. 4th at 769-76, 884 P.2d at 647-51, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 816-21.
4. Id. at 769, 884 P.2d at 647, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 816. The Trinity County Board
of Supervisors approved a three year memorandum of understanding with the Trinity
county Employees' Association whereby the county agreed to implement a retirement
program. Id. at 770, 884 P.2d at 647, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 816. The program provided
that each employee "could retire at age 60 with an annuity of 2 percent of his or
her salary." Id. In addition, the county agreed to pay each employee's individual con-
tribution to the retirement plan. Id.
Concern over the county's financial commitment disturbed many within the com-
munity. Id. at 770, 884 P.2d at 648, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 817. Despite assurances from
county officials that the financial burden on the county would not be detrimental,
citizens of the county collected and filed the requisite number of signatures needed
for a referendum vote. Id. at 771, 884 P.2d at 648, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 817. Normally
this would require the "[bloard to either repeal the ordinance or to put it up for a
referendum vote." Id. See generally 38 CAL. JUR. 3D Initiative and Referendum § 58
(1977 & Supp. 1995) (explaining the procedures for referendum). On advice of coun-
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court of appeal,5 upholding the constitutionality of Government Code
Section 25123(e), which exempts from referendum ordinances on com-
pensation related memorandum of understanding [hereinafter MOU]
between county supervisors and public employees.' The court reasoned
that the statute dealt with issues of statewide rather than local concern.7
II. TREATMENT
A. Justice Mosk's Majority Opinion
1. Article XI(1)(b) Neither Restricts Nor Secures the Local Right
to Referendum on Employee Compensation Decisions
Justice Mosk dealt initially with the proper interpretation of article
XI(1)(b) of the California Constitution.' Trinity County argued that since
article XI(1)(b) specifically mentioned referendum power in connection
with the governing body, other employee compensation decisions were
not subject to referendum.' Justice Mosk explained that even if the stat-
ute created a right to referendum on public employee compensation, a
similar provision regarding supervisor's salaries was not created by impli-
cation." In addition, Justice Mosk noted that the authors of the statute
sel the board refused to do either. Voters, 8 Cal. 4th at 770, 884 P.2d at 648, 35 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 817. In response, the Voters for Responsible Retirement [hereinafter
VFRR] filed a writ of mandate with the superior court to compel the referendum. Id.
5. Voters, 8 Cal. 4th at 783, 884 P.2d at 645, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 816. The court
of appeal's ruling reversed the trial court holding that the county ordinance was sub-
ject to referendum. Id. at 771, 884 P.2d at 648, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 817.
6. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 25123(e) (West 1981 & Supp. 1995). The statute does not
expressly exempt memorandum of understanding from referendum, but impliedly ex-
cludes them because they must take effect immediately. See infra notes 21-22 and ac-
companying text.
7. Voters, 8 Cal. 4th at 778-84, 884 P.2d at 653-56, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 822-25.
8. Id. at 771, 884 P.2d at 648, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 817. Both the VFRR and the
Board of Supervisors each relied on countervailing interpretations of Article XI(1)(b).
Id.
9. Id. at 771-72, 884 P.2d at 648-49, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 817-18. The Board of
Supervisors used the wording on the ballot of the November 1970 amendment to
prove the intent of the drafters. Id. at 772-76, 884 P.2d at 649-51, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
818-20. See Hill v. N.C.A.A, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 16-17, 865 P.2d 633, 64142, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d
834, 84243 (1994) (holding that arguments contained in the official ballot of an ordi-
nance indicate the intent of the drafters). The Board contended that if the right of
referendum on employee compensation was in the prior June 1970 amendment, then
the inclusion of identical language subsequently would have been duplicative and
unnecessary. Voters, 8 Cal. 4th at 771-72, 884 P.2d at 648-49, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 817-
18.
10. Voters, 8 Cal. 4th at 772-73, 884 P.2d at 649, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 818. Justice
may have wanted to give the right of referendum on supervisor's salaries
an independent constitutional basis."
In contrast, Voters for Responsible Retirement [hereinafter VFRR]
argued that article XI(1)(b) in fact, did give the electorate the power to
vote on public employee compensation.'2 VFRR relied on article XI, sec-
tion 13 as the crux of its argument. 3 The purpose of the article was to
preserve all relevant constitutional provisions that existed immediately
prior to the amendment of article XI." Justice Mosk swept aside these
arguments asserting that section thirteen was not applicable to the in-
stant circumstances. 5 He further contended that even if section 13 was
applicable, article XI did not contain any references to the right of refer-
Mosk explained that since the amendment gave county supervisors the right to set
their own salaries, the drafters clearly would have wanted the built in referendum
safeguard. Id.
11. Id. at 773, 884 P.2d at 649-50, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 818-19. The court acknowl-
edged this possibility because the legislature may, under certain circumstances, re-
strict local power of referendum. Id.; see 7 B.E. WrrITUN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW,
Constitutional Law § 123-124 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1994) (discussing exceptions to
initiative and referendum powers); see also Chip Lowe, Public Safety Legislation and
the Referendum Power: A Reexamination, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 591, 590-95 (1986) (exam-
ining certain exceptions to the referendum power of the electorate). See generally 38
CAL. JUR. 3D Initiative and Referendum § 2 (1977 & Supp. 1995) (explaining limita-
tions on referendum).
12. Voters, 8 Cal. 4th at 774-75, 884 P.2d at 650-52, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 819-21. The
argument had its roots in the predecessor to article XI(1)(b), that is article X, § 5,
which came into existence in 1933 by amendment. Id. VFRR argued that the 1933
amendment, as shown by the election ballot, proved that the legislature had intended
to subject employee compensation to referendum. Id. The ballot stated, "[t]he act
which is validated by this constitutional amendment . . . provides that state laws
fixing salaries . . . may be superseded by ordinance hereafter adopted, subject to
regular . . . referendum powers of the people." Id. at 775, 884 P.2d at 650-51, 35 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 819-20 (citation omitted).
13. Voters, 8 Cal. 4th at 774-75, 884 P.2d at 650-51, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819-20.
14. Id. California Constitution Article XI, § 13 states in pertinent part
The provisions of sections l(b) . . . of this Article relating to matters af-
fecting the distribution of powers between the Legislature and cities and
counties, . . . shall be construed as a restatement of all related provisions of
the Constitution in effect immediately prior to the effective date of this
amendment, and as making no substantive change.
CAL. CONST. art XI, § 13.
15. Voters, 8 Cal. 4th at 776, 884 P.2d at 651, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 820. Justice
Mosk explained that in article XI, § 13, "the restriction of the local right of referen-
dum does not affect the distribution of power between the counties and the Legisla-
ture; rather it concerns the apportionment of local legislative power between the
boards of supervisors and the county electorate." Id. at 775-76, 884 P.2d at 651, 35
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 820. Thus, he noted, the article could not be read as preserving the
referendum provisions of former article XI, § 5. Id. (citing Committee of Seven Thou-
sand v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 3d 491, 511-12, 754 P.2d 708, 720-21, 247 Cal. Rptr. at
362, 374-75 (1988)).
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endum over public employee compensation.16 In sum, article XI(1)(b) by
itself neither guaranteed nor restricted the electorate's right to vote by
referendum on county supervisors' decisions regarding employee com-
pensation. 7
2. The California Government Code Section 25123(e) Exemption
From Referendum is Constitutionally Justified Because, When
Considered With Other Related Statutes, it Advances Legislative
Goals That are a Matter of Statewide Concern
First, the court explained that the electorate's rights in cities and
counties to referendum derive from article II, section 11" of the Califor-
nia Constitution.'9 Accordingly, the electorate is not to be deprived of
this right absent a clear showing of legislative intent.2" The requisite in-
tent is shown when a statute is required to take effect immediately.2
The court pointed out that section 25123(e)' parallels section 37512' of
the California Election Code, which allows for certain classes of ordi-
nances that must go into effect immediately to be immune from referen-
16. Voters, 8 Cal. 4th at 774-75, 884 P.2d at 650-51, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 819-20.
Justice Mosk simply pointed out that article XI, § 5 as it existed "immediately prior"
to the present article XI(1)(b) had deleted all references to referendum, and thus the
only part preserved would be an article void of references to referendum. Id. at 774-
75, 884 P.2d at 650-51, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 819-20. For a more complete survey of
former article XI, § 5 see John W. Witt, State Regulation of Local Labor Relations:
The Demise of Home Rule in California?, 23 HASTINGS LJ. 809 (1972).
17. Voters, 8 Cal. 4th at 775, 884 P.2d at 651, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 820.
18. CAL CONST. art. I, § 11.
19. Voters, 8 Cal. 4th at 776, 884 P.2d at 652, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 821. See 7 B.E.
WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAuFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law §§ 175-179 (9th ed. 1987 &
Supp. 1994); see also, 82 C.J.S. Initiative and Referendum § 115-117 (1984 & Supp.
1995) (discussing initiative and referendum).
20. Voters, at 776-77, 884 P.2d at 652, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 821. See Associated
Home Builders v. Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d. 582, 591, 557 P.2d 473, 477, 135 Cal. Rptr.
41, 45 (1976) (explaining the liberal interpreting of initiative and referendum powers);
see also Collins v. San Francisco, 112 Cal. App. 2d 719, 730, 247 P.2d 362, 369 (1952)
(stating that absent a clear showing of legislative intent local laws by the board of
supervisors are presumed subject to referendum).
21. Voters, 8 Cal. 4th at 777, 884 P.2d at 652, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 821.
22. CAL GOV'T CODE § 25123(e) (West 1981 & Supp. 1995).
23. CAL. ELEc. CODE § 3751 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995).
1083
dum.' Therefore, as section 25123(e) is specifically required to take ef-
fect immediately, it is valid.25
Next, the court explained that the people's general right to referen-
dum derived from article II, section 9.26 This could be restricted only by
the exceptions found implicitly within the article and also by the
legislature's power to enact laws that advance goals of statewide impor-
tance." While section 25123(e) deals with local MOUs, the court found
that the statute, when viewed in conjunction with the Meyers-Milias-
Brown Acte [hereinafter MMBA], addressed a matter of statewide con-
cern.
29
The MMBA deals extensively with the negotiating process of labor
contracts between public employers and public employees.' The culmi-
nation of the negotiations between the two parties is the MOU.3 ' The
MOU is then considered a binding agreement and takes effect immedi-
ately.' Consequently, it is immune from referendum.' The court noted
that MOU immunity was justified because the salaries of public employ-
24. Voters, 8 Cal. 4th at 777-78, 884 P.2d at 652-54, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 821-22.
County ordinances in California, are to take effect 30 days after being passed unless
the ordinance is excepted by the statute. Id. Within these 30 days, if voters acquire
the requisite number of signatures for a referendum, the board of supervisors for the
county must either suspend the ordinance or put it up for a referendum vote. Id.
Thus, if an ordinance takes effect upon passage, it is subject to a referendum vote.
Id.; see CAL. ELEc. CODE § 3751-3754 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995); Donald S. Greenberg,
The Scope of Initiative and Referendum in California, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1717 (1966)
(discussing the referendum procedure).
25. Voters, 8 Cal. 4th at 777-78, 884 P.2d at 652-54, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 821-22.
26. Id. at 777-78, 884 P.2d at 652-54, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 821-22 (citing CAL CONST.
art. H, § 9, cl. a).
27. Id. at 777-80, 884 P.2d at 652-54, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 821-23. See 7 B.E.WrIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law §§ 123-124 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp.
1994); 38 CAL JuR. 3D Initiative and Referendum §§ 2, 3, 11, 56, 58 (1977 & Supp.
1995) (explaining the different parts of the referendum process); Michael B.P. Wilmar,
Note, Judicial Limitation on the Initiative and Referendum in California Munici-
palities, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 805 (1966) (detailing exceptions to referendum power).
28. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3500 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995).
29. Voters, at 779-84, 884 P.2d 653-56, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 822-25. See International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union 1245 v. City of Gridley, 34 Cal. 3d 191, 202, 666
P.2d 960, 966, 193 Cal. Rptr. 518, 523 (1983) (stating that matters dealing with the
MMBA were matters of statewide concern).
30. Voters, 8 Cal. 4th at 780-81, 884 P.2d 654-55, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 823-24. For
indepth discussions of the MMBA see 52 CAL. JUR. 3D Public Officers §§ 184-186
(1977 & Supp. 1995); Joseph R. Grodin, Public Employee Bargaining in California:
The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act in the Courts, 23 HASTINGS LJ. 719 (1972); Robert W.
Stroup, The Collective Bargaining Process at the Municipal Level Lingers in its
Chrysalis Stage, 14 SANTA CLARA L REV. 397 (1974).
31. Voters, 8 Cal. 4th at 781-84, 884 P.2d at 654-55, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 823-24.
32. Id. at 778, 884 P.2d at 652, 655, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 821, 824.
33. Id. at 778, 884 P.2d at 652, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 821.
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ees were a matter of statewide concern and because referendum would
have a disastrous effect on the negotiating process.' Section 25123(e),
therefore, was constitutional," and consequently, ordinance No. 1161, as
passed by the county supervisors was immune from referendum.
B. Justice Kennard's Concurring Opinion
In Justice Kennard's concurring opinion, she disagreed with the
majority's contention that the earlier version of article XI(1)(b), former
article XI, section 5, secured to county voters the right of referendum on
ordinances affecting county employee compensation. 7 Such a right, she
argued, was not guaranteed because the authors of article XI, section 5
did not insert express language granting this right.8 Therefore, former
article XI, section 5 did not guarantee the right of referendum to local
voters on county employee compensation ordinances. 9
* 34. Id. at 781-84, 884 P.2d at 655-56, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 824-25. If the electorate
were allowed referendum votes on MOUs it would effectively undermine the purpose
of the MMBA and sanction bad faith bargaining. Id. In essence, once the county
board of supervisors had come to an agreement with public employees over any
issue, the board would not be able to insure that the agreement would be implement-
ed without being subject to veto by referendum. Id.; see Glendale City Employees'
Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 15 Cal. 3d 328, 336, 540 P.2d 609, 614, 124 Cal. Rptr. 513,
518 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976) (holding that the procedures established
by the MMBA would be meaningless if MOUs could be rendered void by a third
party).
35. Voters, 8 Cal. 4th at 783-84, 884 P.2d at 656, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 825.
36. Id. at 784-86, 884 P.2d at 656-58, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 825-27. The last question
that the court addressed was over the actual implementation of the MOU that put
the new county retirement plan into affect. Id. The board of supervisors passed the
MOU in November, but it was not until December that the actual ordinance was
ratified through a subsequent vote on the amendment to the old retirement plan.
Consequently, there was a question of whether the ordinance actually fell within the
procedures of section 25123(e). Id. However, the court stated that the ordinance,
which officially came into effect in December, related specifically to the implementa-
tion of the MOU passed in November. The ordinance, therefore, fell within the pro-
cedures of section 25123(e). Id.
37. Id. at 786-90, 884 P.2d at 658-60, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 827-29 (Kennard, J., con-
curring).
38. Id. at 778-79, 884 P.2d at 659-60, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 828-29 (Kennard, J., con-
curring).
39. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring).
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III. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
Article XI(1)(b) was amended in 1933 and 1962 and reached its pres-
ent form through another amendment in 1970. o Depending on whose
interpretation one follows, it is possible that initially Article XI(1)(b)
gave voters the right of referendum with regard to decisions about public
employee compensation.4 In Voters, however, the court made clear that
the current article XI(1)(b), neither restricts nor inhibits the right of
referendum on public employee compensation decisions.42 In the future,
therefore, article XI(1)(b) will not be the basis of referendum debates
dealing with public employee compensation.
It is also apparent that the California Legislature may constitutional-
ly restrict the right to referendum on subjects that appear to be strictly
local.' This can be done by enacting statutes such as section 25123(e)
where the issue addressed is of statewide concern." The difficult task
in the future will be for California judges to determine whether some-
thing is of local or statewide concern.
The practical ramifications of Voters are plain. First, Article XI(1)(b)
of the California Constitution neither restricts nor inhibits the right to
referendum in matters regarding public employee compensation.4" Sec-
ond, the people's right to referendum is not absolute.46 Instead, it can
be restricted by both the implicit language of the Constitution and by
statute where the restriction addresses a matter of statewide concern.4"
The difficulty for courts will be in discerning what constitutes a matter
of statewide concern.
It remains unclear, however, whether the Voters decision will de-
prive citizens of the fundamental freedom to impact local policy.
WILLIAM ANTHONY BAIRD
40. Voters, 8 Cal. 4th at 771-77, 884 P.2d at 817-21, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 648-52.
41. Id. at 770-90, 884 P.2d at 816-29, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 647-60. The conflict exists
between Justice Kennard and the remaining members of the court. Id.
42. Id. at 770, 884 P.2d at 816, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 647.
43. Id. at 780-84, 884 P.2d at 823-25, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654-57.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 770, 884 P.2d at 816, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 647.
46. Id. at 776-84, 884 P.2d at 821-25, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652-57.
47. Id.
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SUMMARIES
I. Civil Procedure
A court's finding that a defendant cannot
reasonably be served except by publication
of the summons is not sufficient to show
that the defendant was not amenable to the
process of the court.
Watts v. Crawford, Supreme Court of Califor-
nia, decided July 6, 1995, 10 Cal. 4th 743, 896
P.2d 807, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81.
Facts. On February 8, 1989, plaintiffs filed an action against defendants
alleging breach of a contract to sell real property. The court issued de-
fendants a summons, though despite reasonable diligence, the plaintiffs
nor the licensed process server succeeded in serving defendants. On
February 6, 1992, plaintiffs petitioned the court for an order authorizing
service of the summons by publication. The trial court, finding that publi-
cation was the only reasonable method of serving the defendant, autho-
rized the service by publication. The service by publication would not
have been effective until three years and forty-eight days after the action
was commenced. In April 1992, the court granted defendant's motion to
dismiss the action for failure to effectuate service of process within the
three year time limit prescribed by statute. The appellate court affirmed.
Holding. The California Supreme Court unanimously affirmed. An ac-
tion must be dismissed if the defendant is not timely served. The time
within which service must be effected may be tolled under the California
Code of Civil Procedure section 583.240(a) if the party to be served is
not amenable to process of the court. Amenability to process equates to
being subject to the state's exercise of personal jurisdiction. A court's
finding that service cannot reasonably be accomplished except by publi-
cation, which is a prerequisite to a court's authorizing service by publica-
tion, is insufficient to show that the defendant was not amenable to the
process of the court. Because the defendant was a resident of California,
owned property in California, and allegedly committed an act within
California that gave rise to the cause of action, the court held that the
1087
defendant possessed sufficient minimum contacts to be subject to the
jurisdiction of the state. Therefore, the defendant was amenable to pro-
cess. No tolling occurred during the time within which service must have
been made, and consequently the dismissal of the suit was mandatory.
II. Compromise and Settlement
The term "party" in Code of Civil Procedure
section 664.6 refers solely to litigants; thus,
parties cannot be bound by settlement
agreements signed only by their attorneys.
Levy v. Superior Court, Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, decided June 22, 1995, 10 Cal. 4th 578,
896 P.2d 171, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 878 (1995).
Facts. Real party in interest, attorney Joseph Golant, brought suit
against his client Abraham Levy to recover $360,000 in legal fees. The
parties discussed a possible settlement which resulted in Golant's attor-
ney signing a five-page settlement offer from Levy's attorney. When
Golant refused to sign a formal settlement agreement, Levy brought suit
under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 which at that time stated: "If
parties to pending litigation stipulate, in writing or orally before the
court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion,
may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement." At trial, it
was undisputed that Golant's attorney confirmed and accepted the terms
of Levy's settlement offer. However, the trial court denied Levy's motion
for entry of judgment ruling that a settlement agreement was not en-
forceable unless signed by the litigant. The court of appeal denied Levy's
writ of mandate.
Holding. To resolve conflict among the courts of appeal, the California
Supreme Court issued an alternative writ concluding that the term "par-
ties" in section 664.6 referred to the litigants alone and did not encom-
pass their attorneys of record. Levy contended that the term "party," as
used in many civil procedure statutes, was commonly understood to
include attorneys as well as the actual litigants. The court refused to
apply the same definition to settlement agreements, reasoning that, un-
like discovery motions, trial motions, and stipulations, settlement agree-
ments impaired the cause of action itself by effectively terminating litiga-
tion and thus required express consent from the litigant. The court em-
phasized that its interpretation of the term "party" required the litigant's
direct participation, ensured actual assent, and minimized the possibility
of conflicting interpretations of the agreement.
1088
[Vol. 23: 1005, 19961 California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
III. Counties
A county has authority under the California
Constitution to amend its charter and cre-
ate a citizens law enforcement review board
under the direction of the county board of
supervisors. Furthermore, granting the re-
view board the power to issue subpoenas is
within the scope of power conferrable on
county officers.
Dibb v. County of San Diego, Supreme Court of
California, decided Dec. 12, 1994, 8 Cal. 4th
1200, 884 P.2d 1003, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55.
Facts. San Diego County citizens voted to amend the county charter in
1990 which allowed the board of supervisors to establish a Citizens Law
Enforcement Review Board (CLERB). The purpose of the CLERB was to
review and investigate citizens' complaints against employees of the sher-
iffs department and the probate department concerning such matters as
the use of excessive force, sexual harassment, and discrimination. In
addition, the CLERB was to advise and make recommendations to the
county board of supervisors concerning complaints against peace offi-
cers. The CLERB was also granted subpoena power in relation to its
investigations.
Plaintiff Dibb filed a taxpayer's suit requesting a permanent irjunc-
tion against the county to prevent it from spending tax dollars to imple-
ment the CLERB. Dibb claimed the county had no authority to create the
review board and argued in the alternative that even if legally created,
the CLERB could not legally issue subpoenas. The trial court denied
plaintiffs application for the injunction, and the court of appeal affirmed
holding that the county board of supervisors was authorized to create
the CLERB under the state constitution.
Holding. The California Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's
ruling, and held that the county was authorized to create the citizens re-
view board under the California Constitution, Article XI, Section 4. The
court found that under section 4(e) of the state constitution, the county
had the right to define the powers of its own local government within
constitutional limits, and that this right included the power to create
citizens' committees to review and study problems of public interest. In
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addition, the court found that the CLERB members were county officers
within the meaning of the state constitution and that the county could
grant the CLERB the power to issue subpoenas under the general "pow-
ers and duties" clause of the California Constitution.
IV. Criminal Law
A. Under California Welfare and Institutions Code,
section 3201(c), a convicted felon involuntarily
committed for narcotic addiction is not entitled
to good behavior and participation credits to
lessen the felon's determinate prison sentence if
the crime was committed on or after January 1,
1983.
People v. Jones, Supreme Court of California, de-
cided August 31, 1995, 11 Cal. 4th 118, 899 P.2d
1358, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 164.
Facts. Following a conviction for selling cocaine in 1991, the defendant
was sentenced to five years imprisonment and received an involuntary
civil commitment to the California Rehabilitation Center for narcotic
addiction. After spending 382 days at the center, the defendant was ex-
cused and the criminal proceedings reinstated. Defendant sought to re-
duce his length of imprisonment by having a portion of the 382 days
applied to his prison sentence. Defendant claimed that California Welfare
and Institutions Code, section 3201(c), enables convicted felons to earn
good behavior and participation credits that could have been earned
pursuant to California Penal Code, section 2931, had they served their
prison sentence instead of being involuntarily committed for drug addic-
tion.
Holding. The supreme court dismissed the defendant's arguments and
held that section 2931 of the California Penal Code, which was amended
in 1982 through the addition of subdivision (d), reduces a convicted fel-
on's determinate prison sentence by time spent in drug rehabilitation
only if the offense was perpetrated before January 1, 1983. The court
stated that while giving credits may constitute sound policy because it
provides a positive incentive for drug rehabilitation, it is the duty of the
state legislature rather than the courts to address this policy issue. Based
on such rationale, the supreme court overturned the ruling of the court
of appeal and held that since the defendant had sold cocaine after Janu-
ary 1, 1983, he was not entitled to apply credits from his past involuntary
civil commitment in order to reduce his determinate prison sentence.
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B. The determination of whether prior convictions
were brought and tried separately, so as to justi-
fy a sentence enhancement for each prior con-
viction, is a question of law for the court.
People v. Wiley, Supreme Court of California, decid-
ed March 2, 1995, 9 Cal. 4th 580, 889 P.2d 541, 38
Cal. Rptr. 2d 347.
Facts. Defendant was charged with attempted murder, assault with a
deadly weapon, and first and second degree burglary. It was also alleged
that defendant had two prior convictions for first degree burglary. This
allowed the prosecution to include two sentence enhancements pursuant
to Penal Code section 667(a)(1), which provides that any person convict-
ed of a serious felony will receive an additional five-year sentence en-
hancement for each prior serious felony conviction on charges "brought
and tried separately." At trial, the jury found defendant guilty of the
charged offenses. Prior to the jury's consideration of the prior convic-
tions, defense counsel requested that the jury determine whether the
prior charges were brought and tried separately. The court refused, stat-
ing that such a request was an issue of law to be decided by the court.
The jury found the prior convictions, and consequently, the defendant's
sentence included two five-year enhancements. However, the trial court
did not expressly state that the prior convictions were brought and tried
separately.
The court of appeal agreed with the trial court regarding the
court's authority to decide whether the prior convictions were brought
and tried separately. However, the court of appeal determined that there
was insufficient evidence to actually prove that the charges were brought
and tried separately, and the court therefore modified the defendant's
sentence by striking one of the five-year enhancements.
Holding. The California Supreme Court reversed in part, but otherwise
affirmed the decision of the court of appeal. The court affirmed the hold-
ing that the determination of whether prior convictions were brought and
tried separately was a question of law for the court. The court explained
that this determination depends upon interpretation of complex and
detailed provisions of California criminal procedure and thus should be
performed by the court and not the jury.
The supreme court reversed the portion of the court of appeal's
decision that modified the defendant's sentence. The court held that the
evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the prior
convictions were brought and tried separately. The court stated that the
prosecution need not supply the filed complaints in order to prove that
the charges were brought separately. The court found that because the
separate convictions had case numbers that differed significantly it could
reasonably be inferred that the charges were initiated separately. There-
fore, the supreme court held that because the prior convictions were
brought and tried separately, the defendant's sentence should include
two five-year enhancements.
C. The trial court is not required to make an inqui-
ry into the factual basis for an unconditional
plea of guilty. In addition, an appellate court is
free to entertain claims by a defendant which
were not identified in the defendant's statement
of grounds or the trial court's certificate of
probable cause.
People v. Hoffard, Supreme Court of California,
decided August 21, 1995, 10 Cal. 4th 1170, 899 P.2d
896, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 827.
Facts. On July 24, 1992, Randall Eugene Hoffard pleaded guilty as
charged, without any conditions or promise as to sentence, to two
counts of committing lewd acts with his under-fourteen stepdaughter. At
that time, the defendant acknowledged that he understood the conse-
quences of his plea and that he was fully advised of, understood, and
expressly waived his constitutional trial rights. The court asked defense
counsel if he concurred with the defendant's plea and would stipulate to
a factual basis, to which counsel responded affirmatively.
At the sentencing hearing, the defendant was denied probation and
was sentenced instead to two concurrent six-year prison terms. The
defendant filed a notice of appeal and written statement in support of
certificate of probable cause. In the written statement, the defendant
identified only one issue for appeal: the denial of a pre-plea motion to
dismiss. The trial court filed the requested certificate of probable cause.
The defendant's opening brief on appeal, however, presented a dif-
ferent ground for appeal: that there was an insufficient factual basis to
support his admission of guilt. The court of appeal ruled that simply
because the defendant presented one theory to the trial court in attempt-
ing to obtain the necessary certificate to appeal, it did not preclude him
from raising a different issue once the certificate was granted. The court
of appeal further held that defense counsel's stipulation, by itself, was
inadequate to establish the factual basis for the plea and therefore re-
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manded to the trial court to allow the prosecution to establish such a
factual basis.
Holding. The California Supreme Court first examined whether the de-
fendant could present a different theory on appeal than he had used to
obtain a certificate of probable cause from the trial court. The supreme
court looked at section 1237.5 of the California Penal Code and found no
express limitation on the issues that may be raised on appeal once the
certificate is granted. Furthermore, the supreme court reasoned that if
the legislature had intended for a limitation to exist, they would have
used language better suited for that purpose in the drafting of the sec-
tion. The supreme court affirmed the court of appeal's decision that any
nonfrivolous issue could be raised on appeal, regardless of what was
stated in the defendant's statement of grounds to the trial court.
The supreme court then examined whether the court of appeal
erred in concluding that the trial court made an insufficient inquiry into
the factual basis of the defendant's plea. Loking to section 1192.5 of the
California Penal Code, the supreme court reversed the court of appeal's
decision to remand the case and held that the section 1192.5 only applies
the requirement of a court inquiry into the factual basis of the plea to
plea bargains, not unconditional pleas.
V. Schools
A court can vacate an injunction upon a
change in the applicable law and does not
abuse its discretion by denying a request
for a modified injunction where no authori-
tative basis for request exists.
Salazar v. Eastin, Supreme Court of Califor-
nia, decided March 20, 1995, 9 Cal. 4th 836,
890 P.2d 43, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 21.
Facts. In 1985, Francisco Salazar and Irene Villalobos sought injunctive
relief in superior court against the enforcement by the Superintendent of
Public Instruction, the Department of Education, and the Board of Edu-
cation, of California Education Code section 39807.5, which authorizes
school districts to charge non-indigent parents and guardians for their
child's public school transportation. The plaintiffs argued that section
39807.5 violated the equal protection and the free school clauses of the
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California Constitution. Without considering the merits of the case, the
trial court denied relief. Plaintiffs appealed and the appellate court decid-
ed the merits and remanded the case to the trial court for issuance of
the injunction.
Although the defendants complied with the order, other school dis-
tricts continued to charge for bussing, and twenty-five school districts
brought suit in superior court seeking a declaratory judgment of the
facial constitutionality of section 39807.5. The California Supreme Court
declared in Arcadia Unified School District v. State Department of Edu-
cation that the provision was facially discriminatory and noted that,
though the decision did not affect the previous injunction, the court was
confident that those parties would initiate the appropriate challenge to
the injunction's continued enforcement.
The state defendants followed the court's suggestion and filed a
motion to vacate. In response, the plaintiffs asked for a modification of
the remedial order as to affect only four districts. They also requested
that the court compel the state defendants' supervision of the enforce-
ment of section 39807.5 within those four districts. The superior court
vacated the injunction. The appellate court reversed and remanded for
the issuance of a modified injunction.
Holding. The California Supreme Court applied an abuse of discretion
standard and determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in vacating the injunction because a court has the power to do so where
the underlying law has changed. Since the Arcadia ruling changed the
law supporting the injunction, it was appropriately vacated.
The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's re-
fusal to modify the injunction and require defendants to oversee the
enforcement of the statute, because plaintiffs had no authoritative basis
for the request and because defendants' enforcement would contradict
the language of section 39807.5 which explicitly grants discretion to the
individual school district's governing boards.
VI. Sentencing
A. A prisoner is not entitled to credit for presen-
tence confinement unless the defendant shows
that the same conduct which led to his convic-
tion was the sole reason for the presentence
custody.
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People v. Brunner, Supreme Court of California,
decided May 4, 1995, 9 Cal. 4th 1178, 898 P.2d
1277, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534.
Facts. On May 25, 1991, pursuant to an arrest warrant for three parole
violations including fleeing from parole supervision, theft, and use of
cocaine supported by a urine test, parole agents seized rock cocaine
from the defendant's person. Although the defendant was released on his
own recognizance for the possession of cocaine, he remained in custody
for the parole violations.
On July 25, 1991, the parole board revoked the defendant's parole
based on the three parole violations and the possession of cocaine. The
defendant received a 12 month prison term and received full credit for
the time he served between May 25 and July 25. On February 2, 1992,
while the defendant was serving his parole revocation term, he pled
guilty to possession of cocaine from the May 25 arrest and was sen-
tenced to sixteen months. The trial court asserted that the defendant was
not entitled to presentence credit.
The court of appeals found that because the parole board used the
cocaine possession as part of the basis for revoking the defendant's pa-
role, the defendant was entitled to credit for the time spent in prison fol-
lowing the parole hearing. Thus, the appellate court determined that the
defendant was entitled to receive credit for the days spent in prison from
July 25 to February 2 because the time was attributable to the same con-
duct.
Holding. The California Supreme Court reversed and held that a prison-
er is not entitled to credit for presentence confinement unless the defen-
dant shows that the same conduct which led to his conviction was the
sole reason for the presentence custody. The court reasoned that Califor-
nia Penal Code, section 2900.5, is intended to prevent someone who is
incarcerated before sentencing from having to spend more time in prison
than someone who is convicted of the same offense but was not impris-
oned prior to sentencing. The court pointed out that section 2900.5 does
not allow credit for presentence confinement when there are other rea-
sons for the presentence custody. The court determined that showing
that the cocaine possession was a basis for the parole revocation and
sentencing was insufficient because there were other unrelated violations
involved that could alone establish revocation of parole. The defendant
was therefore unentitled to credit of time served because he failed to
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demonstrate that but for the possession of cocaine, he would not have
been incarcerated.
B. A defendant who is classified as a habitual of-
fender under California Penal Code, section
667.7, and is convicted of murder must be sen-
tenced under section 667.7. Furthermore, the
minimum period of imprisonment should be de-
termined by taking into account the term im-
posed by any prior sentence enhancements for
serious felony convictions. Lastly, section 667.7
allows imposing consecutive life terms upon ha-
bitual defendants whose crimes are punishable
under section 667.7.
People v. Robert Earl Jenkins, Supreme Court of
California, decided May 18, 1995, 10 Cal. 4th 234,
893 P.2d 1224, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 903.
Facts. On September 9, 1990 Robert Jenkins entered the residence of
Raymond Pacheco, Ben Padilla, and Cecilia McLaughlin. He strangled
and then fatally stabbed Pacheco. Afterwards, he threatened Padilla with
a knife and then inflicted a serious injury to Padilla by hitting him in the
head with a toaster. The state charged Jenkins with one count of murder
and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon. The charges alleged
that all three counts met the requirements of habitual offender status
because Jenkins satisfied the requirement due to his two prior serious
felony convictions. The trial court found that Jenkins did qualify as a
habitual offender under California Penal Code, section 667.7, and Jenkins
was therefore convicted of second degree murder and assault with a
deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced Jenkins under the provisions of
section 667.7 to a life sentence with a minimum of twenty years before
probation, along with a three year term, which was enhanced ten years
for the two prior felony convictions. However, the trial court struck both
convictions because the court interpreted section 667.7 to mean that
these sentences merged into the life sentence for the murder conviction.
The appellate court reversed and remanded. On remand, the trial
court gave Jenkins the same sentencing as the previous trial court. The
appellate court again reversed, this time because the trial court proceed-
ed on the erroneous premise that it lacked discretion to impose sentenc-
es for separate offenses that would run consecutively to the life sentence
imposed under section 667.7.
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Holding. The supreme court reversed and held that the minimum time a
defendant who is convicted of murder must serve is determined by tak-
ing into account terms imposed pursuant to any sentence enhancement
for prior felony convictions. The court further held that a defendant who
has committed more than one violent felony may receive consecutive life
sentences as long as each felony independently would have subjected the
defendant to a life sentence.
Hence, the supreme court found that Jenkins met the requirements
of a habitual offender under section 667.7, and accordingly should be
,sentenced under that section. The court reasoned that section 667.7 must
be interpreted as meaning that a defendant classified as a habitual of-
fender and a murderer must serve a prison term equal in length to a non-
habitual defendant convicted of murder and sentenced under a different
section. Therefore, the habitual defendant convicted of murder could be
sentenced under section 667.7. The court held that a sentence imposed
under section 667.7 must be equal to terms served under other sentenc-
ing sections. Because other sentencing sections take into account sen-
tence enhancements for prior felony convictions, section 667.7 should
also take into account prior convictions in order for the sentence to be
equal.
Lastly, the court explained that it is within the discretion of the sen-
tencing court to impose back to back life sentences for felonies so long
as each felony independently would have subjected the defendant to a
life sentence.
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